

Red Editor Attacks Talk By Lippman

By David Miller

Herald Tribune News Service

MOSCOW, June 26—Columnist Walter Lippmann drew the fire of the Communist Party's leading theoreticians today for saying that the West was forging ahead.

"Such an assertion contradicts obvious facts and contradicts the numerous statements made by Lippmann himself," said Kommunist, the Communist Party's theoretical journal.

The criticism of the columnist was unusual because of the high regard in which he is generally held in the Soviet press. A number of his articles have been reprinted here.

In describing Lippmann as the "patriarch of bourgeois journalists," the magazine said he was one of the few bourgeois journalists "more or less capable of soberly assessing the course of international events."

What made Kommunist unhappy was Lippmann's May 24 speech before the American Law Institute in which he said "the correlation of forces in the world has become more favorable for the western community."

In a 3200-word article entitled "Lippmann against Lippmann," the magazine charged that Lippmann was trying to "prove the unprovable."

The magazine said he had overlooked Soviet arms, misunderstood "certain difficulties" in Soviet agriculture, ignored the stock market's troubles and soft-pedaled NATO's internal weaknesses.

"The task of Lippmann and of those whose mouthpiece he is, is to deflect the attention of Americans from this sad picture . . . Walter Lippmann himself understands the instability of his position."

"In our times," the magazine said, "one of the deepest turns in world history is taking place."

"Imperialism has lost forever a great part of humanity. The peoples of the world are making their conclusive choice and this choice is in favor of socialism through freedom and national independence."

As proof, the magazine said an attempt was being made to change "hated" capitalism—a system it said had brought oppression, exploitation, wars and coercion.

"Millions of Americans," the magazine said, "are trying to learn the truth about socialism and communism, rejecting the myth of the almightiness and exclusiveness of American imperialism. This mood is noticeably strengthening among the youth."

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Khrushchev to Lippmann — Face to Face. No. 3

My Conclusion: Sobering

This is the last of the three articles in Mr. Lippmann's significant series based on long talks with Mr. Khrushchev.

By Walter Lippmann

It was clear to me at the end of a long talk that in Mr. Khrushchev's mind the future of Germany is the key question. I sought first to understand why he thinks the German problem is so urgent, and so I asked him whether, since agreement was so far off, a standstill of five or ten years might not be desirable. He said this was impossible. Why? Because there must be a German solution before "Hitler's generals with their twelve NATO divisions" get atomic weapons from France and the United States. Before this happens there must be a peace treaty defining the frontiers of Poland and Czechoslovakia and stabilizing the existence of the East German State. Otherwise, West Germany will drag NATO into a war for the unification of Germany and the restoration of the old Eastern frontier.

His feeling of urgency, then, springs from two causes: His need to consolidate the Communist East German State—known for short as the GDR—and second, his need to do this before West Germany is rearmed. He said several times that he would soon bring the German question to a head. Quite evidently, the possibility of nuclear arms for West Germany is not immediate. Bonn does not now have the weapons and although the possibility of it is real enough, the threat is not so urgent as to be a matter of a few months. The more immediately urgent consideration is, no doubt, the need to stabilize the East German regime, particularly in view of the flow of refugees.

My general impression was that he was firmly resolved, perhaps irretrievably committed, to a showdown on the German question. But it was evident also that he dreaded the tension—he referred to this several times—and is still looking for a negotiation which will work out a postponement and an accommodation.

In talks it transpired that he is thinking of the problem as having three phases.

The first is what he considers the real and also the eventual solution. He has no hope, however, that the West will now accept it. His thesis is as follows: The two Germanys cannot be reunited. The West will not agree to a unified Communist Germany and the Soviet Union will not agree to the absorption and destruction of the GDR by West Germany. There are in fact two Germanys. The way to proceed is, then, to "codify" the status quo in the form of peace treaties with what he called the three elements of Germany. These three elements are West Germany, East Germany, and West Berlin.

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This codification would require de facto but not diplomatic recognition of the GDR. It would fix by international statute the position of West Berlin as "a free city," with its rights of access and its internal liberty guaranteed by the presence of "symbolic contingents" of French, British, American and Russian troops, by neutral troops under the aegis of the U. N., and by the signatures of the two Germans and the four occupying powers.

As I said above, Mr. Khrushchev does not expect at this time to reach this solution. He has, therefore, a second position which he called a "fallback" position. This is essentially that of the Soviets at the last Geneva conference of the Foreign Ministers. It would call for a temporary agreement in the Russian view but not in our view this temporary agreement would have a short and fixed time limit of perhaps two to three years. During this time the two German states would be invited to negotiate on a form of unification—perhaps, though he did not say so specifically in this talk, a kind of loose confederation. At the end of the fixed period of time, if a new agreement about West Berlin along the lines I have outlined previously was reached, it would be embodied in a treaty. If no agreement was reached, the legal rights of occupation would lapse.

This German solution was, as we know, refused by the West. But if there is to be another round of negotiation, variants on it are likely to be the substance of the bargaining.

If this fails, Mr. Khrushchev's third position is that he will sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Then the GDR will in the Soviet view be sovereign over the rights of access to West Berlin. If the Western powers refuse to do business with the GDR and use force to enter West Berlin, then the Soviet government will use the Red Army to blockade West Berlin.

Though it would be foolish to undervalue his determination, the threat is not quite so fierce as it sounds. For he most certainly does not want a military showdown, and "doing business" with the GDR is a flexible and not a rigid conception.

I have confined myself strictly to reporting my understanding of the Soviet policy on Germany. If I may venture an opinion of my own, I would make these points.

First, Mr. Khrushchev will not precipitate a crisis until he has had a chance to talk face-to-face with President Kennedy.

Second, he will surely sign a separate peace treaty if he cannot negotiate a temporary accommodation which is described under his "second position."

Third, the crucial points which will determine whether the German question is resolved by negotiation or goes to a showdown are whether the prospect of nuclear arms for Germany increases or diminishes, and whether or not we say that the freedom of West Berlin, to which we are pledged, can be maintained only by a refusal to negotiate about this future.

I have been asked many times since we left the Soviet Union to come to London whether I found the whole interview encouraging or depressing. I found it sobering. On the one hand, the evidence was convincing that the U. S. S. R. is not contemplating war and is genuinely concerned to prevent any crisis, be it in Laos, in Cuba, or in Germany, from becoming uncontrollable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Soviet government has a relentless determination to foster the revolutionary movement in the underdeveloped countries. This relentless determination springs from an unqualified faith in the predestined acceptance of communism by the underdeveloped countries. The Soviet government has great confidence in its own military forces. But it regards them not as an instrument of world conquest, but as the guardian against American interference with the predestined world revolution.

I was sobered by all this because I do not think there is any bluff in it.

Mr. Tolson ✓
 Mr. Mohr ✓
 Mr. Parsons ✓
 Mr. Belmont ✓
 Mr. Callahan ✓
 Mr. DeLoach ✓
 Mr. Malone ✓
 Mr. McGuire ✓
 Mr. Rosen ✓
 Mr. Tamm ✓
 Mr. Trotter ✓
 Mr. W.C. Sullivan ✓
 Tele. Room ✓
 Mr. Ingram ✓
 Miss Gandy ✓

Alice Widener Says:

Lippmann, FBI Chief Take Opposite Stand

NEW YORK—The announcement that J. Edgar Hoover will remain in his post as director of the FBI was greeted with cries of anguish by members of the Communist Party, USA.

Or wasn't it?

After all, people who don't exist cannot emit any kind of sound, and Walter Lippmann asserts there is no Communist Party in our country.

In this, of course, Lippmann differs with J. Edgar Hoover. Perhaps Lippmann believes he knows more about the subject of communism than anyone else in the United States. At any rate, he declared in a recent column about the 1960 political campaign, "Unlike any other large country in the world, there is no Socialist, much less a Communist Party in this country."

Only a few months earlier, Hoover told Congress that activities of the Communist Party, USA, are a constant threat to America.

Evidently, Lippmann has weak eyesight affecting one angle of his vision of our national political life. It seems he easily can recognize from afar a Communist like Khrushchev or Mao Tse-tung. But Lippmann always has had great difficulty in recognizing an American Communist when he sees one, even at closest range. Years ago, for example, Lippmann had an American Communist as his personal secretary.

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Today and Tomorrow . . . By Walter Lippmann

Little Rock Again

TWICE DURING his press conference last week the President was asked questions on the subject of integration and civil rights. The first question had to do with Little Rock and the second with his appointments, which have not yet been made, to the Civil Rights Commission. This is the commission that was authorized by Congress in the bill passed at the end of August.



Lippmann

The President said that in Little Rock—the situation “seems to improve daily” and “I most devoutly hope and pray that we soon can be confident enough of the situation that we can remove all Federal forces.” In his comments on the Civil Rights Commission there was no suggestion that in his mind there will be any close connection between the Commission, when it is appointed, and the policy of the Federal Government in dealing with a situation like that in Little Rock.

This indicates, I hope wrongly, that the President and the Administration are not at work trying to form an orderly national policy but are improvising as one aspect or another of the enormous problem forces itself upon their attention. How, for example, is he going to know that he should be confident that he can remove all Federal forces from Arkansas? One would suppose that he would look to the Civil Rights Commission, if it had been set up in operation, to advise him.

It can perhaps be argued that on a narrow construction of the law, the commission is not supposed to have the responsibility and duty of advising the President and the Department of Justice in specific situations like that at Little Rock. On the other hand, the President can, if

I read the law correctly, take a broad view of it and especially of that part which says that the commission shall “appraise the laws and policies (italics supplied) of the Federal Government with respect to equal protection of the laws under the Constitution.”

IF IT IS NOT to be the commission which advises him in a situation like Little Rock, who is it to be? Is it to be the Department of Justice or is it to be some anonymous assistant on the White House staff? The President must begin to feel by this time that, while Governor Faubus had put down a challenge which had to be met, the Administration's role in the whole affair was not wisely conceived and well planned.

For example, only confusion was produced by his meeting with Governor Faubus at Newport, and never since then has the President succeeded in making the country understand precisely what was the issue—namely the order the Governor gave to the Arkansas National Guard—which required Federal intervention. Moreover, the character of the intervention was surely unnecessarily clumsy and provocative. Was it necessary to send the crack troops of the Airborne Division with their bayonets fixed, or would it have been wiser to deputize Federal marshals, or even to send a detachment of military police carrying policemen's clubs?

These catch-as-catch-can methods will not do in handling so grave and so explosive a problem. The President needs a continuing body of advisers, whose main business in life is to plan the role to be played by the Federal Government in the field of civil rights. Surely, it is within the terms of the law that the new Civil Rights Commission should be used as a policy-forming organ of the Federal Government in the field of civil rights.

TWO months have passed since the law was enacted, and during these two months we have had Little Rock and all its consequences and implications. But there is as yet no Commission. We know that the President has been finding it difficult to get acceptances from the men he has wanted to appoint.

Judging by what he said at his press conference last week, I wonder whether a good part of his difficulty in finding men does not come from his own contradictory ideas about what kind of men he is looking for. He wants “people of thoughtful mien and type whose reputation is that of being of a judicial turn of mind, watching these things and deciding what to do.” He wants also to “have represented on the Commission all types of thinking.” He wants “to get a spectrum of American opinion on this matter.”

IS IT ANY wonder that it has been hard for him to appoint a Commission? On the one hand, he wants men of a judicial turn of mind. On the other hand he wants “all types of thinking.” He wants a Commission which on the subject of civil rights is as judicial as, let us say, Adlai Stevenson, and he wants also to have represented the thinking of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People and of Senator Byrd of Virginia and of Gov. Griffin of Georgia.

These contradictions come from a hope, which is quite vain, that he can set up a Commission which pleases everybody. He should be looking for a Commission which is capable of formulating a coherent national policy. What he needs is a clear-headed and resolute Commission which will translate into orderly policies for the guidance of the Administration what is now a chaos of lawsuits and court orders.

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The Worker ☐
New Leader ☐

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TODAY AND TOMORROW

By WALTER LIPPMANN

The Charge of Treason

Representative Clare E. Hoffman has been asking the Democrats for a list of names that he can use without making them angry. I am afraid that Mr. Hoffman has not quite understood just why the President disavowed the charges of treason in the Lincoln's birthday speeches.

The list of names that one politician may call, another is almost, but not quite, unlimited. The list, moreover, can always be enlarged whenever a politician comes along with a knack for calling names. He does not have to refrain because his epithets will make his opponent angry. Indeed, politics being a rough and manly game, he may use names with the intention of making the other fellow so angry that he becomes rattled and does foolish things. This is a very free country.

There is, however, a blacklist on name calling. The test is not whether the name makes a man angry; or whether it is coarse, mean, insulting; not even whether it is untrue. The test is whether the name is one which—if it is untrue and is not retracted—a man of honor cannot forgive. As long as the libel stands there can be between him and the man who made it only an implacable enmity.

Treason, like murder, is a capital offense. To call a man a traitor, to accuse him of aiding and abetting treason, is to make a mortal accusation. If the accuser is right, the traitor should be brought to trial and if convicted he deserves to die. And if the man is falsely accused, if he is libeled and traduced by a deliberate and calculated lie, he must resent it and he must not rest until the accusation is knocked out. It is not merely his private right to vindicate his honor. It is his public duty to vindicate his honor. For the making of false accusations, especially of capital crimes like treason and murder, is a sub-

version of freedom of speech and grave disorderly conduct which threatens the integrity of a nation.

Is it necessary to spell out why the charge of treason, made deliberately and with knowing untruth by one party against another, is an intolerable political offense? For those who have forgotten why, or perhaps have never known, let it be said that to incite one half of the people against the other half, putting between them the mortal issue of treason, is to enter upon the commission of a political crime which can bring terrible consequences.

It is a gruesome irony that this organized incitement to a fratricidal division of our people was begun with the blessings of the chairman of the Republican National Committee, at meetings in honor of Abraham Lincoln. It makes one shudder at the desecration of his memory—at having to hear cruel and calculating voices summoning the nation to civil disunion in the name of the martyr of the American Civil War.

The seriousness of the offense lies in the fact that, despite the President's disavowal of the charge of treason, the campaign is sponsored by the chairman of the Republican Committee. The evidence is not conclusive but it is very strong that the resort to this tactic, the use of McCarthy, Jenner and the like to force and fix the political issues, reflects a deliberate and high level political decision. With the President himself reluctant and protesting, it would appear from their actions that there has been a radical decision by the politicians of the Eisenhower wing of the Republican party.

Beginning with Mr. Brownell's Chicago speech and his use of the F. B. I. files for partisan purposes, going on to Gov.

Dewey's unprecedented—unprecedented for him—political violence and venom at Hartford, and then down to Chairman Hall's encouragement of the firebrands—there is a remarkably clear pattern.

The Brownell speech marked a radical turn away from the principles and the ideals which Gen. Eisenhower represents. It was made almost immediately after the ominous Republican political reverses in Wisconsin, New Jersey, and New York. Since then the underlying economic trends have not been favorable to Republican political prospects. It is only too evident that the politicians around the President are very much frightened. The Brownell-Dewey-Hall line, since the lost elections of the autumn can be explained only by supposing that they are afraid not only of losing the House of Representatives to the Democrats but also of losing their own party position and perhaps their political heads to the extreme anti-Eisenhower and anti-Dewey wing of the party.

Their new line is explicable only in terms of something like panic fear, of a profound feeling of political insecurity. Their line is designed as protection against the exploitation by McCarthy of a political setback in November. If the election goes better than they now fear, they will still be in the saddle though considerably bedraggled in appearance. If the election goes badly, they hope—though almost certainly in vain—to make McCarthy share the blame and not to be able to raise hell at their expense.

The President, who cannot be happy about all this, might find it useful at this point to invite his political advisers to read and to ponder the famous and oft-told tale of Doctor Faustus and his pact with a very slick and plausible gent.

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Date: FEB 1

Today And Tomorrow . . . By Walter Lippmann

The New Loyalty Policy

THE FIRST MOVES of the Administration in dealing with the loyalty and security of Government employees had manifestly been well studied and carefully prepared before they took office. The country expected a change. On the lines laid down by the President in his message and with the measures



Lippmann

which have now been announced by the Attorney General, Mr. Brownell, there is every prospect that the change will not be nominal but real.

The new policy can, I think, be described as a cool and lucid recognition of the lessons which can be learned from the trials and errors of the Truman Administration.

IN HIS MESSAGE the President put his finger on the present situation: on the fact that the Executive branch is in "disorder and confusion" because it has lost to the investigating committees of Congress what is the "primary responsibility" of the Executive—that of "keeping out the disloyal and the dangerous." The situation as it is now is an intolerable one. For Congress cannot exercise the responsibility which the Executive has lost. That is to say Congress cannot screen the vast army of Government employees. The conflict between Congress and the Executive over whether the screening is honest, fair, efficient has shaken deeply the confidence of the country that this most vital matter is being adequately handled. This loss of confidence is the breeding ground of panic fears which are undermining the unity of the Nation and injuring deeply its good name in the world.

The need, therefore, is to restore confidence that the Executive branch of the Government is meeting its primary responsibility. The problem is how to do this.

THE MAIN LESSON to be drawn from the trials and errors of the Truman Administration is that after its reluctance and hesitation to deal with the problem at all, it then posed the problem in terms which were impossible to administer efficiently or justly. I am referring to the President's original Executive Order of March 21, 1947, which stated that "the standards of the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an Executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States. To prove that a man is disloyal to the Government of the United States, that he is a spy and a traitor, is to convict him of a terrible crime—of what is in fact a capital offense in time of war and at any other time calls for punishment far more severe than merely to lose a Federal job. To convict a man under this order meant that he was branded for life, was politically and morally dead.

Inevitably, therefore, the procedure broke down. The men who had to carry out this order might well have agreed that a person was a bad security risk because of his associations or because he was a drunkard or a sexual pervert, subject to blackmail, or that he was a loose talker. But they could not in good conscience find that he was a traitor or a spy in order to get rid of him. After three years of operation under this order the Chairman of the Board of Review, Mr. Seth Richardson, a man of invulnerable integrity, reported to Congress that not a single instance of espionage or attempted espionage had been discovered in the hundreds of cases reviewed. This negative showing could not and did not satisfy Congress or the country. For the most certain thing that it showed was that disloyalty is an exceedingly difficult offense to prove. It did not give the Nation confidence that employees were being screened out who, though not disloyal, were bad security

TO MEET this situation the Truman Administration in 1951 issued another Executive Order. It is a legal horror. It said that a Government employee could be branded for disloyalty, in effect that he could be morally executed, if the administering board had a "reasonable doubt" as to his loyalty. "By this change," as Mr. John Lord O'Brian has said, "the Anglo-Saxon presumption of innocence is shifted and for all practical purposes the burden is placed upon the individual to prove beyond a reasonable doubt his loyalty and integrity. When it is remembered that the employees or applicants are being judged not on their actions but on their supposed ideas or mental attitudes and that the charges against them may be based on secret evidence, the extreme nature of this final action is apparent."

The action was so extreme that far from making the Government system of security efficient, it has brought it down in confusion and disrepute. In the Vincent case the procedure set up by the Truman Administration reached its grotesque climax when three members of the final Review Board found that they had reasonable doubts of Mr. Vincent's loyalty and two found that they had no reasonable doubts of his loyalty: this left the country with the net judgment of the Board that there was reasonable doubt as to whether there was reasonable doubt of his loyalty.

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THE EISENHOWER Administration has cut straight through this jungle of incompetence and injustice. It has done this first by laying down the "basic principle," as the President said, "that public employment is not a right but a privilege," and second, by setting up the standard that the question is not whether the man is loyal, namely whether he is a traitor or a spy, but whether he is a security risk. This new standard will make it easier to refuse employment and to dismiss in that it will no longer be necessary to destroy a man by branding him as disloyal when in fact he may be an undesirable public employee because at worst he has kept bad company or has bad personal habits or is a foolish fellow.

The new system fixes the responsibility on the head of the Department and gives him very large discretion. It will need, as the President said, to be exercised with "care and justice." But whatever its imperfections, it should be infinitely preferable to the excruciating spectacles of the present loyalty proceedings.

THE NEW POLICY gives the Executive more power to dismiss or refuse employment, but the penalty on the individual is much reduced. Under the system that the President is setting up, it should be possible to fire a man without destroying him without in fact branding him at all as befits a civilized state.

Under the firm and clear-headed administration of Mr. Brownell, there should be no reason, as Senator McCarthy has in fact already recognized quite handsomely, why committees of Congress should attempt to take over the Executive responsibility. They need not feel and they could not argue that they know how to screen the Federal employees better than does Mr. Brownell and his security officers in the various departments. The FBI is under Mr. Brownell. The files of the FBI are the basis of the whole operation. They cannot, as President Truman insisted, be given to Congress without violating the principles and usages of our Government, and without injuring deeply the efficiency of the FBI. Without these files Congress cannot screen the Federal employees.

Therefore, until and unless Congress has any serious reason to question the efficiency of Mr. Brownell's administration, the loyalty and security business in the Federal Government should be back where it belongs.

Times-Herald
Wash. Post
Wash. News
Wash. Star
N.Y. Herald Tribune
N.Y. Mirror

Date: _____

By Walter Lippmann

The Investigation Business

THE NEXT BIG show is scheduled to open, it appears, when Senator Hickenlooper releases the necessary micro-



LIPPMANN

phones, television cameras and klieg lights. It is to be an exhibition match between the Navy and the Air Force, and the advertisements say that no holds are to be barred. The show is to be conducted by

the Armed Services Committee of the House. According to the advanced billing by the chairman, Mr. Vinson, as reported by the Associated Press, the investigation has "seven major objectives."

Among the seven major objectives, which the 36 Congressmen are going to shoot at, there are some stupendous objectives. They are going "to examine the performance characteristics of the B-36 bomber to determine whether it is a satisfactory weapon." They are going "to examine the roles and missions of the Air Force and the Navy to determine whether or not the decision to cancel construction of the aircraft carrier *United States* was sound." They are going "to study the effectiveness of strategic bombing to determine whether the Nation is sound in following this concept to its present extent."

THE COMMITTEE is not, however, going to investigate its own capacity to investigate the performance characteristics of the B-36 bomber, the roles and the missions of the Navy and the Air Force, and the effectiveness of strategic bombing. That is assumed and taken for granted. Yet that is the very question which needs some discussion before the uproar starts.

THE QUESTION is whether 36 Congressmen, after cross-examining a long list of admirals and generals, can decide by a count of their own noses the issues which this committee proposes to decide.

They are the issues which the best military and scientific minds of all countries are continually studying and debating. They are the issues on which only the ignorant speak with certainty. They are the issues on which the more qualified the man, the more thoroughly informed, the more intimate his knowledge of the hidden and essential details, the more tentative and experimental are his conclusions. They are issues involving the security of the United States, the self-confidence and morale of fighting men. They are issues which cannot be decided yes or no but only by a close calculation of alternative risks.

YET THESE issues are to be "investigated" and "determined" by a public spectacle. Is this not

the culminating example of how the investigating procedure of Congress has been allowed to degenerate to a point where the vital interests of the United States and the intellectual integrity of Congress itself are in jeopardy?

When a congressional committee sets itself up to determine the performance characteristics of a bomber and the roles and missions of the various armed forces in the unknown strategical situations of a hypothetical war, then surely it must be recognized that these investigating committees rush in where men with even a little wisdom would fear to tread.

THE ONLY reason the country puts up with this way of dealing with grave questions is that the whole subject of military technology and strategy is so remote from the daily life of most of us. But the absurdity of the procedure would quickly be self-evident if Senator Hickenlooper or Representatives Vinson and Van Zandt set out to determine the performance characteristics of ammoniated tooth powder in preventing dental decay, or the roles and missions of surgery and medicine, or the effectiveness of a high protein diet.

intrusions into matters which cannot be determined by votes of uninformed and untrained men is enormous. Not only is the general public misled and miseducated, but the informed and trained men, who alone can make the responsible decisions, are so harried and wearied by these investigations that they cannot do their work.

If all the leading surgeons and doctors had to spend days and weeks expounding the performance characteristics of their instruments and their medicines to congressional committees, and debating their roles and missions, the investigation business and racket would flourish while a lot of their patients died.

BUT THAT IS what is happening to the public business in Washington. If someone took the trouble to count the hours of time which the Secretary of State and his chief advisers have spent preparing for committee hearings, waiting to appear before committees, appearing before committees, and cleaning up the messes caused at home and abroad by half-truths and misunderstandings, he would have at least a part of the explanation of why our contribution in the Paris Conference has been so singularly uninteresting and unimportant.

If he will add to it the time and energy demanded of the whole higher administration of the Pentagon, of Mr. Paul Hoffman and his staff, he will begin to appreciate what these show-cost measured in time lost and energy wasted that should be devoted to profound thought and to difficult decisions.

Mr. Tol
Mr. Clee
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Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

A Talk With A Communist

AT THE END of a long conversation which I had with one of the most important Communists in eastern Europe, I



asked him whether in view of all his harsh condemnation of American purposes, political and actions he thought there would ever be a world settlement. Certainly, he replied. And

when do you believe it will be reached, I asked. He said in about three to five years.

HIS ANSWER, it seemed to me, as I thought about it afterwards, threw a great deal of light on many things which he had said in the course of the whole conversation which preceded it. Thus he had complained bitterly that his country was being denied credits which was entitled to have. He had told me quite candidly that his government had wanted to participate in the Paris Conference but had been forbidden to do so by Stalin himself. He had said that as between economic advantage and the political security of the Russian alliance, his country had no choice but to choose the alliance.

But he said also, though in a different part of the conversation, that having studied the Paris report, he now knew that his country, which needs capital goods, would have gotten little immediate advantage out of participating. Then he went on to discuss the Marshall Plan. In the first place, he said, your Congress will not now give enough help to save the middle class social structure of Great Britain and France. In the second place, he help you give will carry with the condition—and here he added Mr. Stassen—that Europe must give up socialism. In the third place, you will insist, as I have already in Italy and in France, that you will not help countries which have Communists in their governments. Yet Communists will be able to show that production cannot be carried on anywhere on the continent without Communists to pose discipline upon the workers. In the fourth place, more the plan fails to bring production in the western countries, the more you will try to build German heavy industry.

You will, he said, with mounting enthusiasm, become more and more unpopular with the masses of Europe. They will see that your promises have not been realized. They will see that your dollars are being used to destroy their independence by stopping the socialism that they want. They will see that you are vetoing the formation of united national fronts. They will see that you are subsidizing them only because you want to use them for the war you are preparing.

AFTER ALL this had been said, and I had had my say in rebuttal—though without any effect—I asked him whether he thought Europe and Russia as well could recover from the war without great help from the United States. No, they cannot, he said. They why, I asked him, do you do your best to prevent us from giving help? Oh well, he answered, you will have to give it anyway, and we can wait until you have to give

help and cannot demand a political price for it. And when will that be, I inquired. When you have your great economic crash which will come when you are overproducing and cannot, being a capitalist country, sell all your goods to your own people and must therefore export. Now, he said, you are able to pretend that you are the great philanthropist offering to help poor Europe; but when you have your 15 million unemployed, your Government will have to subsidize exports to Europe to make your own factories profitable again.

This, in condensed form and translated from his Marxist jargon and stripped of the propagandist trimmings which he did me the honor of not expecting me to believe, is a pretty fair picture of how an intelligent and responsible Communist looks at the present situation and the near future.

HIS FINAL prediction that there would be a general settlement in three to five years can, I think, be restated in the light of the conversation which I have reported. His theory was that an economic crash, greater than that of 1929, is certain to occur within the next five years. Before it occurs he believes that we shall not grant enough aid

to Europe to save the predominantly middle class society of Great Britain and France, that to this insufficient aid we shall attach political conditions which will turn gratitude for the help into resentment against our politics. After our crash, on the other hand, he believes that we shall be compelled to give greater aid in order to cure our own unemployment and that when that help comes, the post-crash help, we shall no longer have anything like our present influence on British and French and Italian policy, on the Germans, and on the terms of the settlement in Europe and in Asia.

IF WE examine this Communist conception of the near future, we find, I think, that it rests on two major premises. The first is that we cannot, and shall not be able to regulate the inflationary boom effectively enough to prevent a deflationary collapse.

My Communist had studied Karl Marx but had never heard much about John Maynard Keynes.

The second major premise is that our diplomacy, as we try to operate the Marshall Plan, will be so blinded by our dollars and our air force and our atomic bomb that it will misjudge the political sentiments and the political realities of postwar Europe—that in our anti-Communist fervor we shall get into bed with the Nazis, the Facists, the collaborators and the quislings all over Europe, that we shall treat the Marshall Plan not as an engine to restore the unity of Europe but as a fund to provide lend lease to those nations and those factions and parties within each nation which make the loudest anti-Communist noises.

The second major premise of the Communists is, in short, that we do not have the diplomatic vision and skill and astuteness to make the Marshall Plan work.

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm ✓
Mr. Clegg ✓
Mr. Glavin ✓
Mr. Ladd ✓
Mr. Nichols ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
Mr. Tracy ✓
Mr. Egan ✓
Mr. Gurnea ✓
Mr. Harbo ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Pennington ✓
Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓
Mr. Nease ✓
Miss Gandy ✓

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Page 2

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Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

Peace: A Calculated Risk

THOUGH OUR relations with the Soviet Union are very bad, there is, I think, ground for saying peace can be made. It cannot be made cheaply, that is to say with soft words, which deny that there is a conflict of power or with tough and angry words, which some fondly suppose will be sufficient to make the hard men in the Kremlin

quake in their boots. The situation in which peace can be established in this world will have to be created initially by a policy of calculated risk—by the strategic application of sufficient American power at a critical point in the immense borderland in Europe and Asia.

In the formation of this policy the first consideration is the time, the second is the place, the third is the opportunity.

TIME IS of the utmost importance. An equilibrium of power has to be attained, which compels the nations to negotiate and compromise and collaborate because they cannot impose their will by force. This equilibrium must be in sight, if it is to be attained at all, within about five years, and it must be stabilized within about 10 years.

For after that the will to peace will be weaker. The men who fought and suffered in this war will be too old to be used in the front lines of another war, and there will be a new military generation available for conscription. After 10 years, Germany and Japan will be again, if not great powers, at the very least important powers, certain to exploit to their own advantage the division among their conquerors.

But until then we shall still be in the postwar period, and it is in this period that power can be used most safely, if it is used wisely, as an instrument of diplomacy. This would be true if rockets, atomic weapons and bacteriological poisons had not been invented. It is all the more true

THE BASIC condition of peace is that power shall be in equilibrium. This is another way of saying that governments will not resort to war because they can have no expectation of winning it. This basic condition does not exist today. Europe, the Middle East and China are turbulent from the effects of war and of revolution, and in this turbulence the Russians, the British and the Americans are contending for power. This contest for power will not be halted by an endless series of rearguard and defensive maneuvers, from Manchuria through Trieste to Warsaw and Berlin. It can be halted by a confrontation of power at a critical and decisive place.

The risks of such an action are real and they are considerable. But they are not so great as the risk of drifting, and of letting the antagonism spread all over the globe, and of having dislike and distrust become fanatical, and of waiting until there is a new military generation armed with the catastrophic weapons.

THE SOVIET government has made quite plain the place where the issue must be resolved. It is in the Eastern Mediterranean with Turkey as the central point. The Russian demands on Turkey have laid bare the strategy of Anglo-Soviet-American relations, and have provided the opening by which it may now be possible to move effectively in the direction of peace.

The fifth point in the Soviet demands is the crucial point. The Soviets are asking Turkey to agree to let them establish themselves as a military power at the Dardanelles for purposes of joint defense. Now this demand has nothing whatsoever to do with Russia's ancient and legitimate desire for assured access to the open sea. For Russian troops and airplanes stationed in Turkey cannot assure Russia access to the sea.

In the two World Wars Ger-

many closed the Dardanelles and bottled up Russia in the Black Sea by coming overland through the Balkans. The Russian defense against that is to halt the Germans before they can enter the Balkans. The defense of the Straits against Germany, if that were what worries the Russians, has to be made on the Danube and beyond.

But that is quite plainly not what worries the Russians now. They have secured themselves against Germany by the Balkan and Central European alliances, and they are reinsuring themselves, as M. Molotov's declaration in July made only too plain, by bidding for an eventual alliance with Germany. The problem of the Dardanelles is, therefore, not the problem of opening them. If it were, Moscow would beg the United States to join in guaranteeing the Dardanelles. For the Dardanelles will not be open unless they are kept open at both ends.

THE RUSSIANS' preoccupation now is not how to keep the Dardanelles open but how to close them. That is perfectly plain in all their demands. Close them to whom? There is no doubt as to the answer. To the Anglo-Americans, the only powers capable of passing through the Dardanelles in force and of entering the Black Sea. The Russian view is clear. It is that unless they control Turkey, its government and its army, Britain and America will, in case of war, not only use the Dardanelles to enter the Black Sea with their enormously preponderant fleets but they will use the northern coasts of Turkey on the Black Sea as a base for aerial and amphibian attacks on what is the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union.

The Russian demands on Turkey show that the Kremlin knows that this is the vulnerable spot—here the Ukraine, politically the least reliable of the Soviet republics, can be reached, here the oil, the coal, and much of the food supply of the Soviet Union are within easy range.

Mr. A
Mr. B
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THIS, THEN, is the place where the issue can best be resolved, and an equilibrium of power restored. Here in the Eastern Mediterranean, behind and near Turkey, is the place where the United States, by building up its sea and air power, can most surely compel and induce the Kremlin to negotiate a general world settlement.

There is no denying that in addition to the risk of a violent Russian reaction, there is the risk that here and in Britain there will be important influences moving heaven and earth to convert the policy of restoring the balance of power into an anti-Soviet crusade. There is no doubt that we are playing with fire, and that this risk must be taken into account. For this is not a policy which cannot fail. This is frankly a policy of calculated risk.

THE risk must, it seems to me, be seen clearly and then accepted. For we are in a vicious circle that must soon be broken or we shall later on be drawn into a war of annihilation. Only a balance of power can end the struggle for power. Only when Soviet and American power confront each other directly at a decisive point will statesmen and people accept the fact that the two systems, the two civilizations, must live in the same world because neither can obliterate the other.

I am in favor of taking the risk, not only because it is a smaller risk than any other but because I do not doubt that our people really want an honorable peace, and that much as they dislike the totalitarian state, they are willing to try to live with it and to let it live. I count also on the British people, and with them on the French and the highly civilized countries of Europe, to make this a policy of peace and not of war. For this policy assures the survival of Britain as a world power, and that should, that surely will, restore the equanimity even of the irascible Mr. Bevin, and to Brit-

ish policy its moderation and magnanimity.

For I believe, indeed I have no doubt, that it has been the weakness and peril of Britain, and nothing worse, which account for so much of recent British policy that is so hard for the ancient friends of Britain to explain and defend.

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CLIPPED FROM WASHINGTON POST
PAGE 9 - SEPT. 5, 1946.

By Walter Lippmann

Knock On Wood

UNTIL THE POLES who are meeting in Moscow announce that they have agreed, the veterans of the Polish question will be knocking on wood and keeping their fingers crossed. Certainly on one previous occasion, and perhaps on two, the question looked so nearly settled that Mr. Churchill is said to have ordered the drinks for the celebration.



LIPPMANN

Yet with all due allowance for the superstition against premature rejoicing, there is no doubt that never before have the three powers and such widely representative Polish leaders been so definitely and so publicly committed to a settlement. There is little doubt that genuine agreement has at last been reached on what the Yalta formula means. The proof of the agreement lies in the fact that now for the first time there is an agreed list of acceptable Polish leaders who are not members of the Provisional Government. They would not have been invited publicly by name if they were not acceptable to Moscow, London, Washington, and Warsaw. Never before have we gotten that far towards a settlement.

VERY PROBABLY never before have Britain, Russia, and America been so likely to exert a united pressure on the invited leaders and the Warsaw government to come to an agreement. We all need such an agreement. Yet unhappily no agreement is possible which all Poles will gladly accept: there are irreconcilable divisions among Poles which no statesmanship, but only time, can heal. A social revolution is breaking up the great feudal estates and the social order associated with them. We cannot expect Polish unanimity while this is going on. The best we can hope for is what the Yalta decision envisages and the Hopkins negotiations have advanced: agreement among representatives of the broad masses of the Polish nation.

On the other hand that much agreement may be possible if the three great powers make it entirely clear that they expect the Poles to unite, and that they do not intend to back certain Poles against certain other Poles. This is the chief service which the United States can perform, and its main obligation when the new reorganized government is recognized: it is to dispel any idea that whereas M. Bierut, for example,

is backed by Moscow, M. Mikolajczyk is backed by London (plus Washington).

ONCE THE NEW government is set up, is recognized, and has fulfilled the promise to call elections, our need and our right to intervene in Polish internal affairs will have ended. With Poland, as indeed with China, we must not drift into being the guardian angels in a policy of perpetual intervention. We had an obligation to restore an independent and free Poland, and that obligation will have been fulfilled if the Yalta formula is carried out.

After that we must not assume, as so many among us do, that being a neighbor to the Soviet Union, Poland's independence must be a sham. To believe this is to assume (a) that Marshal Stalin's promise is insincere, (b) that the Soviet Union has no reasons of self-interest for wanting an independent Poland, (c) that the Polish nation could easily be subjugated.

THERE ARE substantial reasons for thinking that Marshal Stalin's promise about Poland is quite sincere, and that he would not have made the promise if it were not consistent with, indeed necessary to, the protection of the vital security of the Soviet Union. Everybody knows that the Soviet policy calls for a "friendly" Polish government: the cynics outside and also, no doubt some of the tougher hables inside Russia have concluded that a friendly government is a puppet government.

Presumably, Stalin would not object to a puppet government if no one complained and if the puppet government worked. But Stalin undoubtedly knows that it is hard to make puppets out of Poles, even out of Communist Poles, and that to govern a nation as big as Poland through puppets will never give the Soviet Union a moment's peace, quiet, and security.

That, I believe, is the reason why Stalin keeps coming back to negotiations to make a more representative Polish government. It is odd that he did not tell us the Polish question was closed if he did not sincerely and for his own good reasons want a more broadly representative Polish government. Why then does he want it? Because, so we may suppose, he knows that only a representative government can give him what he needs and wants the most—a Poland that can be relied upon to help keep Germany harmless and to have no truck with anyone seeking to foment war against the Soviet Union.

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THE WASHINGTON POST
DATE: 6-14-45

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By Walter Lippmann

No Hemispheric Isolation

San Francisco.

THE BIG FIVE having reached agreement among themselves on amendments, the consultation with the other nations has begun.



LIPPMANN

to regional arrangements for the use of force.

We have proposed an amendment to the Dumbarton Oaks text, which is really a clarification rather than a change, under which specific pacts directed against the renewal of German or Japanese aggression go into effect without the approval of the Security Council. This covers bilateral pacts such as the Anglo-Soviet and the Franco-Soviet; it would cover a pact such as Senator Vandenberg proposed in his celebrated speech of last January; it covers our whole rights to enforce the surrender now imposed on Germany and those which will be imposed on Japan.

THE PURPOSE of all this is to make sure that action against a renewal of German and Japanese aggression will be prompt and effective; that it shall not be stalled by the veto of nations which have no direct power and no immediate responsibility in policing the enemy states. It is a special arrangement and it is provisional, that is to say it is to last only until the principal belligerents agree that Germany and Japan have been made safe members of the international community.

There is another regional arrangement worked out at Mexico City for the defense of the American republics. The question has now been raised whether it too should be made independent of the Security Council. There is a strong desire among many of the Latin American republics to do this. But the United States can not agree to that. This looks like an illogical attitude and calls for careful and patient explanation. Why should the Security Council have authority over enforcement action under the Act of Chapultepec and not over enforcement action under the pacts which are to police Germany and Japan?

There is no contradiction if we remember that we are talking about military security. The anti-German arrangements which bind Britain, France, Russia, the United States and the states bordering on Germany, are true security arrangements in that these nations can in fact police Germany. They are, moreover, provisional in that they will be liquidated in due time.

THE ACT OF CHAPULTEPEC, on the other hand, is not a true and full security arrangement in that the Western Hemisphere can not be defended successfully by the states which have signed the Act of Chapultepec. The United States, which is the only great military power among them, can insure the security of the Western Hemisphere only in conjunction with great non-American powers. To make the Act of Cha-

pultepec autonomous would be for the United States to make a military commitment which it cannot carry out. We must make our basic security arrangements with the British Commonwealth, with France, and with the Soviet Union. If the Western Hemisphere is to continue to enjoy the security which it has enjoyed for a hundred years. For that reason, whenever there is a question of important military action, we must be able to come to agreement with the principal powers in the Security Council.

AT THIS STAGE in the World War it ought to be perfectly clear to all the American republics that the Western Hemisphere is incapable of isolated self-defense. It is, of course, very necessary to have solidarity in the Western Hemisphere, and the lack of it, thanks to Argentina, has cost us dearly. But American solidarity in itself will not provide American security. In this war, the effective defense of the Americas was begun when General Eisenhower landed in North Africa, and when the battles of Midway and Guadalcanal had been fought. Eisenhower could not have landed in Africa had we not been the ally of Britain, and no less of Russia, which engaged so large a part of the German army. Nor could we have mounted the defense at Guadalcanal without the alliance of Australia, New Zealand, and the British Commonwealth.

In defending the Americas we had very great assistance from many Latin American states, particularly from Brazil in the south Atlantic. But the decisive battles which preserved the Western Hemisphere we fought on the other side of the Atlantic and in the distant Pacific. So we must not be asked now to forget these strategic realities, and to indulge in the illusion that the inter-American system is strategically self-sufficient. It never has been—as President Monroe, who inaugurated it, knew—and the two world wars of the twentieth century have proved it beyond serious challenge.

To say all this is not to minimize the great promise of the Act of Chapultepec. In fact, it is entirely consistent with the final paragraph of that act, which was put there by Senators Austin and Connally to make sure that the American republics did not relapse into the dangerous illusion of hemispheric isolationism.

THE SYSTEM of inter-American law which has been developing is not jeopardized by recognizing the fact that the military security of the Americas requires cooperation and therefore consultation with non-American powers. On the contrary, it is only under full military security that the inter-American system of law can develop and flourish, and disputes among the American republics be adjusted peaceably, and in accord with the principles laid down in the Act of Chapultepec.

Let us hope that there will be no serious misunderstanding on this issue, and that none of our Latin American neighbors will place us in the position of having to choose between solidarity with them, which we cherish so highly, and the strategic realities of security for ourselves and for the world which we can forget only at our peril.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
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W. Lippmann - P
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87 MAY 14 1945

WASHINGTON POST
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Today and Tomorrow

The German Drama

(Mr. Lippmann has just returned from Europe. His picture of the German situation today is of first importance. We have heard much of the Russian "Iron Curtain." Mr. Lippmann brings to the fore the British "Silken Curtain." The clash between the two, he points out, imperils peace, which is the desire of a war-torn world.)

By Walter Lippmann

The European reaction to his disarmament treaty should be enough to convince Mr. Byrnes that his advisers have not supplied him with a true picture of the German situation. The proposal was still a top secret when I left Paris a week ago Monday; when I read the text in the New York newspapers the next morning, I would have bet right then and there that the Russians would be rude and angry and that the British would brush it off with frigid politeness. For the proposal, which would have been well-received in 1944, is based on a radical misunderstanding of what is happening in Germany. It takes no account of, and indeed runs afoul of, the evolution of Soviet and British policy. That is why it has met such a rebuff.



Lippmann

play an enormous part. Though battered, the Germans are still by all odds the strongest nation in Europe. A duel is in progress between London and Moscow for the control of the German population, and its high military potential.

The grim reality of this Anglo-Soviet duel is not altogether hidden from the Americans. But it is obscured for them even in Germany, and apparently its significance has not been appreciated at all in Washington.

There is an important reason why the American government is basically misinformed; why it has lost touch with the realities. It is that the Americans abroad are not dealing at first hand with the main elements of the German situation. In the division of these zones of occupation the United States got that part of Germany where nothing that really matters is happening, or can be made to happen. Our people are conscientiously doing the best they can, and in General Clay they have a chief who in character, bearing, and competence represents the very best of the American tradition. But as to running Germany, and determining its destiny, the Americans are not in the driver's seat. They are passengers and back-seat drivers.

President Roosevelt must have guessed that this would happen if the United States was relegated to Southern Germany. He argued for a long time against Mr. Churchill's insistence that Britain should have the zone which, because it contains the oceanic ports and the Ruhr, is the key position in Germany, and indeed in Europe. President Roosevelt had to give in. As a result it is only nominally true to say that Germany has been divided into four zones of occupation.

The more revealing way to describe the arrangement is to say that the Soviet Union and Britain have divided Prussia between them, leaving the South German states to be divided between France and the United States. Now since 1866, when Bismarck defeated the South German state, Prussia has dominated Germany. Prussia contains all the essential elements of the German power; the strategical gateways into the Low Countries and France, the oceanic ports, the primary resources, the basic industries, the strongest and most numerous population, the political party machines and their bosses, the headquarters of the trade unions, of the banks, of the cartels, of the communications, the main markets, the apparatus of publicity, the Lutheran Church, the homeland of the military caste, the centralized bureaucracy, and, last but by no means least, the capital city of Berlin.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. E. A. Tamm
Mr. Clegg
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Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carson
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Mr. Pennington
Mr. Quinn Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Gandy

Handwritten signatures and initials:
J. Pennington
J. Ladd
J. Glavin

Handwritten: J. Ladd

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58 SEP 18 1946

Whoever rules Prussia has for the past 80 years ruled Germany. The Americans are not ruling in Prussia. The British and the Russians have divided it between them, and the inner drama of Germany is the contest between them for the control of Prussia. The outcome of that contest is bound to determine the destiny of the whole of Germany, and of Europe, and of the world.

If the reader now asks how all this is to be reconciled with the spirit of the Allied pledges to disarm and demilitarize Germany, I am afraid the answer is that only among the Americans and the French is the avowed policy the real policy. The real policies of the British and of the Russians are disclosed by their actions rather than by their formal statements. They may be described, I think, as a reversion, gradual but accelerating, by drift rather than by clear intention, to their prewar illusions about Germany, namely, to the notion that each can find a way to use a united Germany. The British, who like to think of the continuity of their foreign policy even when it is wrong, are reverting to the notion of Neville Chamberlain: that Britain can turn Germany against Russia. The Soviets, who also have a remarkable continuity, are reverting toward the basic conception which produced the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939: that Germany can be turned away from Russia against the west.

* * * * *

Much of this Anglo-Soviet duel is hidden from view, yet not so much but that we know that much is hidden. The German officers who were captured at Stalingrad, and were for a time used to make propaganda against Hitler, have disappeared behind the famous iron curtain. But it would be naive to suppose that they do not continue to form an important connection with important elements of the German army.

There is also a German army, a large and good one, which surrendered to the British. The story of that surrender has still to be told in detail. The story of what happened to that German army after the surrender is still hidden behind a silken curtain. Enough is, however, known to warrant the statement that the corps of officers in this particular army were treated with exceptional consideration, with enough chivalry to justify them in feeling that their careers as professional soldiers were not necessarily and finally terminated. Their treatment may have been in fact merely sportsmanship to a loser and chivalry to the vanquished. But it has suited remarkably what these German nationalists most want to believe—namely, that they will live to fight another war in which Germany will recover her territory and her greatness.

* * * * *

What is happening on the surface confirms in every way what can only be inferred about what is happening under the surface. In the open the Anglo-Soviet duel is being fought out through the German political parties. The Russians, of course, are sponsoring and promoting the Communist party. Its most prominent leader is Wilhelm Peick; its director, I am reliably informed, is Walter Ulbricht, a former officer on Marshal Zukov's staff, whose wife has been one of the marshal's secretaries. The object of the Communist Party is to swallow the Socialist Party, and thus to unite under one command the whole German working class. In the Soviet zone and in Berlin, this has been accomplished. The British, on the other hand, are sponsoring the Social Democratic Party under the leadership of Dr. Schumacher, who resists the fusion of the Socialists with the Communist Party. They appear to be thinking wishfully that the British

See LIPPMANN, Page 2, Column 7

This is a clipping from
the Washington Post

7 May 1946

LIPPMANN

From Page 1

Labor Party can resurrect the Second Socialist International to combat the Third Communist International.

The most noteworthy fact about this political contact is that it is turning into an auction to gain the favor of patriotic German nationalists. The Russians, bidding among the Germans for popular support of the Communists, are having to take the position that Germany should not be dismembered, certainly not in the west, and that the unity of Germany must be restored. This is, of course, a bit difficult to reconcile with the annexation of German territory by Poland. But the German Communists, who are now as always German nationalists, have a very good private answer to this anomaly. It is that in the end a Soviet Germany and a Soviet Russia will once again partition Poland, and that this will happen when war with the western powers is imminent.

The British, bidding for German support of their Social Democrats, are also having to offer unity to the Germans. They are meeting the Russian bid. As a result the political "reeducation" of Germany, about which we have heard so much, now consists in teaching the Germans that by exploiting the competition between Britain and Russia, making the two rivals bid against each other, they can recover the unity of Germany and make themselves the decisive military factor in the European and world balance of power! The walls of Berlin are covered with Communist posters, ostensibly calling for the unity of the Socialists and Communists, which have as their slogan, "Durch Einheit zum Sieg" (through unity to victory). These are the very words, and were chosen because they were the very words—the trumpets and the banners—of German nationalism, pan-Germanism, and indeed of Nazism.

Our friends in Moscow and in London are acting as if they had learned nothing about Germany. For here they are, returning to the very policies which brought them to the very edge of disaster. One would think the British foreign office would know by this time that in a contest with the Russians for Germany, the Germans will play one against the other till Germany has recovered her power; that then Germany will turn first against the west because the western powers are weaker. And one would think the Russians would have realized by this time that German Communists are Germans, and that after they have turned against the west, they will turn against Russia.

After all, if London and Moscow revert to their prewar policies, they are foolish indeed if they do not realize that the Germans will also revert to their pre-war policies. And we shall commit the greatest folly of all if, instead of exposing and denouncing this mad Anglo-Soviet contest, and intervening to liquidate it,—we let ourselves be sucked into it, blindly following the leadership of the blind.

This, as I was able to observe it, is the German drama today. In my next article, I shall try to indicate how we, given the curious position we have in Germany, can best obtain a leverage to intervene in order to avert what will otherwise most certainly be a catastrophe for the whole world.

This is a clipping from
the Washington Post

7 May 1946

The Munichmen of 1945

IT'S JUST about time to do some plain talking about the wilful efforts to wreck the San Francisco conference.

The main purpose of the conference seems clear enough: to set up an international security organization, resting on the military power and the political solidarity of the Big Three, strong enough to prevent another world holocaust. In the first instance this obviously means keeping Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace.

This single aim, big enough to occupy the time of any conference, has been obscured by a welter of side issues and amendments. It is not in itself too serious that there should be differences of opinion between the big powers on such questions as Poland. But the evidence is accumulating that powerful forces are planning diversions.

Walter Lippman suggests in a column from San Francisco that the real difficulty is that too many people there are worrying about what to do with the Soviet Union after the war rather than with Germany, and are hoping to use an international organization to police the Soviet Union rather than Germany.

Lippman ought to know what he is talking about. He has in the past dallied with anti-Soviet speculation of his own. He has plenty of friends and news sources in official and diplomatic circles. And he has always been a spokesman for influential sections of big business opinion.

We might as well face the fact that the opening of the San Francisco conference has also marked the beginning of a powerful offensive to change the fundamental course of Big Three collaboration charted at Teheran and Yalta by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin.

Of course, ex-President Hoover and Sen. Vandenberg are the most articulate spokesmen for this offensive. But let's not kid ourselves. They are not alone. They have plenty of support among newspaper publishers, GOP politicians, reactionary-church officials and businessmen and even among some circles within the administration.

Poland is the popular organ, the rallying cry of this offensive. They talk about a democratic Poland—and mean a Poland of the anti-Soviet colonel Beck. But more than this. They talk about freedom for Poland and other small nations—and mean the revival of a powerful, aggressive Germany to fight the Soviet Union.

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This is a clipping from
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DAILY WORKER

Date 4-27-46

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50 MAY 13 1946

Hoover's Aim

Let's not forget that Hoover wants justice not only for the small nations. He wants justice for Germany too. In his newly published book, he warns against "victory with vengeance" over Germany. He wants us to wait until the "hot emotions of war," the recollections of the Nazi torture camps, have cooled off.

This is the time for the Munichmen of 1945 to fight the policies of Yalta for irrevocably destroying the war potential of Germany. With the citadel of world fascism on the verge of total defeat, it will be too late pretty soon to reverse Yalta.

This is the time for them to fight the policy of Big Three unity—which Red Star has again underscored as the main condition for success of the San Francisco parley. It will be much harder when the foundation of a world security organization is firmly laid.

This is the time for them to sow the wild oats of anti-Soviet adventurism, to talk big about cracking down on the Russians—when they think they can cash in on the death of the architect of the Big Three coalition, of the great friend of Soviet-American collaboration.

Vigilance Needed

We do not say that the Munichmen of today will win out. It will not be easy for them to reverse the course of history. But we do say that the danger is there, not to be laughed off or minimized.

Walter Lippmann, surely not given to sensational statements, says that if we begin thinking now of another hypothetical war, before this war is over, we are likely to get all we are asking for, and more. And this is just the road we will travel if we take the advice of those who want a soft peace for Germany—and a hard-boiled attitude toward the Soviet Union.

The Munichmen of 1938 in Great Britain and France could not realize their hope of destroying the Soviet Union. But they visited fearful calamity on their own countries. We fear the Munichmen of 1945 not only because of their designs against the Soviet Union. We fear most of all the consequences of their policies for America.

This is the challenge our nation confronts today as the San Francisco conference meets. It is to give substance to the ideals of Franklin Roosevelt, to the goal of world peace. It is to fight the Munichmen whose dreams have not been squelched even by oceans of blood. It is to thwart for all time the schemes of those who would disrupt the unity of the Big Three.

What Russia Fears

Post By Barnet Nover 3/20/45

Pravda And Mr. Walter Lippmann

THE ATTACK which Pravda has made on Walter Lippmann for views he allegedly expressed in his book, "U. S. War Aims," throws a very revealing light on Soviet foreign policy.

At first glance, to be sure, the attack appears to be the product of nothing more or less than the mental confusion on the part of one A. Gyorgiev, author of the article in question, and of the editors of Pravda.

Both in his latest books as in his newspaper columns Mr. Lippmann has been very sympathetic to the Soviet viewpoint and recently went to great lengths to justify the Yalta accord in general and the Polish settlement in particular.

Moreover, he has been an ardent advocate of Soviet-American friendship and has specifically opposed the recreation of that post-World War I cordon sanitaire along Russia's western borders which the Pravda article now accuses him of favoring.

WITH UNDERSTANDABLE bewilderment but with praiseworthy calm Mr. Lippmann has suggested that perhaps Mr. Gyorgiev has not read the book he has denounced or, if he has read it, has not understood it.

This is charitable. But it is hardly correct. It is now more than eight months since Mr. Lippmann's book came off the press and it is now almost two years since his earlier volume, "U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield Of the Republic," expounding substantially the same views first made its appearance.

It is a reasonable presumption, therefore, that the editors of Pravda have had time to become acquainted with Mr. Lippmann's views. And by the same token it is fair to assume that they are attacking these views not because they do not understand them but because they do not like them.

In both his recent volumes, Mr. Lippmann argues for a regional organization of the world community. One of these regional combinations which he approves is what he has designated as "the Russian orbit," an orbit which became a reality as a result of the Russian-Finnish, the Allied-Romanian and the Allied-Bulgarian armistices, the silent absorption of the three pre-war Baltic republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the Yalta agreement regarding Poland.

THE FACT that Mr. Lippmann has approved the creation of the Russian orbit both as a theoretical possibility when Russian troops were still a long distance away from Poland, Romania and Hungary—and as an emerging reality has not spared him from attack by Pravda. For Mr. Lippmann also favors the establishment of another regional combination which he calls "The Atlantic Community." It is this

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proposal that Pravda has seen fit to take to task as an idea "contrary to all the principles of the United Nations," a "threat to enduring peace," a throwback to "the old plan of Versailles, Locarno and Munich," and the revival of the idea of the "cordon sanitaire."

This Atlantic Community as envisaged by Mr. Lippmann would include the United States, Great Britain, the British dominions, the Latin American republics and the nations of Western Europe, including France, and such other nations as Sweden, Greece and Switzerland.

IN MR. LIPPMANN'S belief this combination of powers containing about 522 million people organized in about 42 sovereign states would not be a combination organized for aggression and domination. "They can unite," he says, "only in self-defense."

That is the way it looks to Mr. Lippmann. It is not the way it looks to the editors of Pravda. They see any combination that does not include Russia as a combination which, however professedly peaceful its purposes may be, is capable of being directed against the Soviet Union, in other words a revived cordon sanitaire.

Regional combinations may be sauce for the Russian goose, but in the eyes of the Kremlin it is not sauce for the Anglo-American gander.

THE QUESTION arises why the editors of Pravda waited as long as they did before unleashing their thunderbolts against Mr. Lippmann and his book.

A clew may be found in the fact that their attack comes after the Chapultepec conference and before San Francisco.

At Chapultepec the pressure from the direction of our Latin American neighbors was for the creation of a regional grouping in the Americas which, had they had their wishes, would have been placed outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations organization that is to emerge at the Golden Gate conference next month, and thus not subject to the veto power which every permanent member on the Council (and Russia is one) can exercise on any matter that comes before that body.

Actually the original plan advocated by some of the Latin American delegates was watered down. But apparently it was not watered down sufficiently to suit the Russians who view it as the potential nucleus of that Atlantic Community which Mr. Lippmann wants to see come into being and which the Russians fear.

Just as the Kremlin opposed the creation of West-European bloc so they oppose any combination of nations outside their orbit. Having achieved their immediate territorial and political ambitions in Eastern Europe they have suddenly gone universalist. It is not hard to see why.

Pravda Scores Lippmann Book As Stating Peace-Periling Idea

Moscow, March 16 (P).—The book on "U. S. War Aims" by Walter Lippmann was assailed by Pravda today as advancing an idea "contrary to all the principles of the United Nations" and which was a "threat to enduring peace."

Pravda said Lippmann advocated an Atlantic community of powers separate from the Russian sphere, and thus espoused "the old plan of Versailles, Locarno and Munich," reviving the idea of the "cordon sanitaire."

"He makes scandalous assertions against Soviet democracy," said the article, signed by A. Gyorgiev, "and brings forward many-typed foolish suspicions relating to Soviet foreign policy, and he concludes that if the Soviet Union will not accept his ideas there cannot be real cooperation between the USSR and the western world."

"Lippmann worries about Germany after the war . . . that it should find a place in the sun. He does not include Germany in the Russian sphere, but in the Atlantic sphere. It is the cordon sanitaire all over again. Experience has shown all attempts to build peace without the participation of the Soviet Union brought terrible results for humanity. Now with the Red army proved to be the savior of European civilization from the Fascist destroyers and the Soviet Union become one of the most important factors in international policy, this proposed postwar system is a modernized sketch of the sanitary cordon."

"Lippmann's aim is to create a large politico-military bloc to include 42 countries with a population of one and one-half billion which would be dominated by the United States."

"When he speaks of the Soviet

Union, he demonstrates his light-headedness and his harmful aim. He has gone too far in giving his own theories as the military aims of the United States. The Crimean conference has shown the unity of the great democratic states in the struggle against Hitlerite Germany and the decision to cooperate with each other in order to create a durable peace after the war."

Lippmann Comments

Commenting on A. Gyorgiev's denunciation in Pravda of his new book on United States military aims, Walter Lippmann said:

"If he has read the book, he hasn't understood it, because one of the prime objects of the book is to do away with any repetition of the cordon sanitaire."

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page 7 of the
Washington Post of
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57 MAY 4 1945

Reckless Walter Lippmann

by James S. Allen

WALTER LIPPMANN has taken on the thankless task of proving that all is for the best in postponing the second front. In his syndicated column, appearing in the New York Herald Tribune last Saturday, he made a really Herculean effort to answer Earl Browder's speech on Quebec and the Coalition.

He admits readily the gravity of Browder's as-

sertion that failure to realize the second front during the beginning of the third year of coalition "poses the alternative: either Britain and the United States are unwilling to carry any proportionate share of the fighting or they are unable to do so. And either of these alternatives is fatal to the concept of full coalition between the three leading great powers."

Lippmann holds that this alternative actually does not exist, that the answer to Browder is to be found in the Mediterranean offensive.

He does not deny that if it were true that the Anglo-American powers could not or did not want to open a second front the consequences would be very serious for the coalition. Browder's assertion is groundless, he argues in essence, because the main strategic blows of the Anglo-American powers are being delivered now in the Mediterranean area.

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ACCORDING to him, when our armies are in Italy we are in the center of Europe, from which we will be in a position to strike out in all decisive directions. He holds that if our armies were to strike into Western Europe from the British Isles they would be "inviting an indecisive battle at the outer defenses of the German position." On the other hand, in our Italian fighting we are forcing our way into the heart of the continent.

That is the real geography of Europe, he claims, and only Churchill and Roosevelt really understand it.

The Channel crossing, according to Lippmann's strategy, must come only as the "kill" after Hitler's forces have been dispersed all over

Europe as a result of the further development of the Mediterranean offensive.

Finally, he says, such is the strategy natural to Britain and America, who are primarily sea and air powers. In this way, he argues, we avoid the kind of land fighting at which Germany excels.

To argue for the second front from the British Isles, he charges, means to discount the whole Mediterranean campaign as a mistake. For if it were correct to open the second front in the West, we should not have committed our forces in the Mediterranean.

IT IS not difficult to answer his arguments from the standpoint of coalition strategy.

The campaign in the Mediterranean and the second front in the West are not contradictory. Churchill has called the whole North Africa-Sicily-Italian operation a "flanking action"—which at least admits that a main blow has to be struck to give the flanking action any strategic meaning.

In fact, we could undertake another flanking action in Norway, extend the campaign from Italy, North Africa and the Middle East into the Balkans and Southern France, and still have merely secondary operations which can contribute a decision only if the main blow is struck simultaneously into Western Europe.

The objective of the winning side in a war should be to strike at the heaviest concentration of enemy forces with the aim of inflicting decisive blows.

From this viewpoint, the number of German divisions we have engaged thus far is lamentably small. In North Africa no more than six; in Sicily three, which got away from us; in Italy we are not likely to engage more than a half dozen. And in none of these battle areas did we divert a single German division from the Eastern Front, where 80 per cent of the German army is concentrated.

This brings us to still another point. The aim of Coalition warfare should be to distribute as equally as possible the burden of defeating the enemy. The advantage of Coalition warfare is that vast forces can be brought into play according to a single strategic plan to take immediate advantage of the weaknesses of the enemy and to bring him to his knees as quickly as possible.

Clearly, the Mediterranean offensive does not fulfill these require-

ments. This is the view not only of the Soviet government but, as Lippmann admits, of many laymen in this country and of some professional soldiers and sailors.

BUT, I charge, Lippmann is not arguing honestly when he attempts to cover up the lack of coalition warfare with arguments of a military-strategic type.

He gave his basic reason for favoring the Mediterranean plan as the main strategic plan in a column which appeared in the Herald Tribune last November 24, shortly after the North African landing.

At that time, he said that the Anglo-American armies would march up the Italian boot and through the Balkans into Central Europe. The military strategy of this campaign, he wrote, is "to trap the German army in Russia and cut off its retreat and destroy it before it can get back to Germany."

The advantages arising from such a victory, he wrote enthusiastically, would be to permit the "liberation" struggle in Europe to develop with Anglo-American aid.

"Under these circumstances," he added, "we shall not run the risk . . . of being drawn into dealing at arm's length with Russia, and of having then to make evil and unnecessary choices between the necessary demands of Russian security and the national rights of our smaller allies."

Here Lippmann made it clear why he thinks that Italy is the center of the Continent: not in relation to the military requirements of the war against Germany, but in relation to the political requirements of dealing with the Soviet Union.

It is, indeed, strange that such a man should accuse Browder of "recklessly exploiting his knowledge to further his political views."

Certainly, it is Lippmann who is the reckless one, ready to scuttle the whole prospect of Anglo-Soviet-American collaboration for victory and the post-war peace in order to pursue certain narrow imperialist interests in Central and Southeast Europe.

In taking up his pen against the second front, he repudiates his own views for a "Nuclear Alliance" of Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States which he developed so well in his recent book. For it is impossible to have a Nuclear Alliance unless you first have a firm Coalition for winning the war. And you cannot have such a Coalition unless you have coalition warfare, which requires the second front in the West.



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ADDITIONAL INDEXING

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Lippman Book Urges U.S.-Soviet Pact

"nuclear alliance" between the Soviet Union and the United States as the only basis on which world security can be assured after this war is won, is strongly urged by Walter Lippmann in his new book published today, S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the public, an Atlantic Monthly book published by Little, Brown and Co. tracing the community of interest which has existed historically in which now operates in the war. Lippman concludes: Here then, founded on vital interest which has been tested and proved in the course of generations, the nuclear alliance upon which depends the maintenance of the world order in which America lives. Combined action by America, Britain and Russia is the irreducible minimum guarantee of the security of each of them, and the only con-

dition under which it is possible even to begin to establish any wider order of security."

"The formation of this nuclear alliance must in our thinking and in our action take precedence over all other considerations."

VICTORY VIEWPOINT

As a special political writer for the New York Herald-Tribune, closely identified with the Willkie Republican, Mr. Lippmann's views are generally considered representative of the most consistent victory and anti-appeasement sector of the Republican Party.

With respect to the Soviet Union, Lippmann shows that historically and during the present war and after there is a "community of interest" between that country and the United States, based upon the national interest of each.

Historic experience shows, he

writes, that despite different political ideologies in the past and now "each has always opposed the dismemberment of the other. Each has always wished the other to be strong. They have never had a collision which made them enemies. Each has regarded the other as a potential friend in the rear of its potential enemies."

With respect to the situation which will arise on the Pacific after the defeat of Japan, Lippmann, says that the Soviet Union will become our closest neighbor on the Pacific and that he could foresee no conflict of vital interests, such as boundary disputes and territorial claims.

"NUCLEAR ALLIANCE"

As regards Europe, he points out the common interest which Britain, the Soviet Union and America have to preserve the peace of the Atlantic community of nations. He hits

out at any policy seeking to establish buffer states against the Soviet Union or looking towards permanent United States military intervention in Europe.

"A settlement," he writes, "which was such that it could be maintained only by aligning American, and therefore also British, military power against Russia in Europe would set the stage inexorably for a third World War in Europe and in Asia as well."

Lippmann advocates the policy of the "nuclear alliance" between the three great anti-Hitler powers as one which should become the established foreign policy of the American government, which, he holds has not had an effective foreign policy for the past fifty years.

He says that such an unambiguous foreign policy as he outlines would provide the basis for firmer national unity.

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principles: one was that in policing the combat zone, the distinction between the alien and the citizen must be preserved; the second was that no one should be disturbed unless evidence, almost good enough to convict him in a court, had been unearthed by the official investigation. Mr. Biddle, who remembers much more vividly what he disliked in the other war than he realizes what has to be done in this war, was producing a situation on the Pacific Coast which by the end of January had become deplorable. He was failing to make this threatened area secure, and what is no less important, he was failing to make the military authorities and the people feel secure. Thus there was a double danger—the danger of the Fifth Column itself and the danger of a popular vigilante movement to deal with it.

His policy had to be scrapped, and replaced by a kind of martial law which is now being administered without preparations made in advance to deal effectively and humanely with the evacuated people. A problem which might profitably have been studied and dealt with by the Office of Civilian Defense is being dealt with by improvisation. What is more, because it has so many far-reaching implications, the security measures are based on the wrong principle: instead of evacuating the areas on the principle of military security which is applicable alike to all citizens and all aliens, Mr. Biddle had no principle when his earlier principles failed him. We are evacuating Japanese, regardless of their citizenship, whereas if the matter had been properly conceived—as a measure of military security—this unfortunate stigma need not in principle have been brought into the matter. The legal fiction, which in a matter of this sort is profoundly important, could have been preserved that we were evacuating individuals and not a racial group.

THE FUMBLING of this aspect of the problem arose from the fact that nowhere in the Government is there anyone in authority who has been able to transcend legalism and bureaucracy in the formulation of a general policy in respect to aliens. This week, for example, the Selective Service announced a classification of aliens. Who prepared that classification? Those coming from "France and possessions" are classified as "neutral" in spite of the fact that French Equatorial Africa and New Caledonia in the Pacific are fighting on our side, in spite of the fact that Free French warships have been repaired in United States navy yards, and Free French merchant ships carry our war supplies.

Austria, the first of Hitler's victims, is not classified at all. Though our Government has never recognized Hitler's seizure of Austria, all Austrians are, for the purpose of the draft, classified automatically as Hitler's men, that is as "enemy aliens." On the other hand, Nazis from the Sudetenland and from Danzig are classified as "cobelligerents" because they come from Czechoslovakia and Polish territory.

IS IT not evident that no one is seriously putting his mind on the question of how to distinguish our friends from our enemies, and that the effect of these fumbles and these paradoxes, of this wooden legalism and dull routine, is to give aid and comfort to our enemies, to bring sorrow and disillusionment to our friends?

Certainly the President cannot take charge of the whole thing himself. But is it not high time that he placed the problem of the aliens here and of their relatives—our hidden allies abroad—in the hands of a man of the first quality, that he installed this statesman in a prominent place in the State Department, and that he directed him to make the actions of the Government conform to the realities of the war and to our peculiar American opportunity in the conduct of the war?

Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

Our Hidden Allies

HITLER WOULD now like to stop the trial at Riom, and so also would his French agent, M. de Brinon. Well they might. For the plot which they engineered has backfired. Despite the terrorism and the treachery which envelops them, the principal figures in the trial — the judges as well as the accused — have shown that they are unconquered Frenchmen.



LIPPMANN

Hitler and his agents may have realized that M. Daladier, M. Blum, and M. Guy LaChambre were, whatever their weaknesses and failings as officials, men of honor and of personal courage. What has surprised Hitler is the degree to which the court itself has shown itself willing to maintain the honor of France. The court is not trying M. Daladier (M. Blum was not in office at the time) for having kept faith with Poland, France's ally. Whereas Hitler would like the Riom court to try M. Daladier for the "crime" of honoring the pledges of France and of resisting Nazi aggression, the Riom court is in fact trying him and the other defendants for not having defeated Hitler. Obviously it is a disconcerting disclosure that a French court, set up by the Vichy government, would have no charges to make against the men if they had soundly defeated the Nazis with whom Vichy professes to be eager to collaborate in founding a new order for last 1000 years.

THUS IT is only too evident that the French nation still consists of Frenchmen, who simply because they are French are waiting, praying, and preparing for their liberation. We must not forget that. For one of the great elements of the war is the fact that behind the enemy's lines we have as our allies all the conquered and all the neutral nations of Europe. There is not one of them which, if the people could choose freely, would fail to say that it desires our victory. When we enter Europe, the civilian population will in the overwhelming majority welcome us as liberators.

This is one of our very greatest resources, as we can readily see from Malaya and from Burma where the position was in reverse and we had no support and the Japanese have had much support from the people of the invaded territory. It should remind us how vitally important it is not to neglect our hidden allies; how inconceivably stupid it will be if we do not take full advantage of the fact that to them America is more than ever the land of promise.

NO ONE knows this better than the President, and indeed no one has a greater hold upon our hidden allies than he has. This, therefore, useful, I believe, to point out that the President's subordinates are falling him lamentably in grasping the opportunity and in making his leadership effective.

There are many branches and agencies of the Government concerned with this great matter — primarily the Department of Justice, the State Department, the Donovan organization, and in lesser though important degree the Treasury, lend-lease, the War Department through the selective service machinery, the Office of Civilian Defense, and the Red Cross. There is however no such thing as a policy — though in the President's mind there is certainly the intention to have a policy. There is no policy because no one who understands the matter has sufficient authority, and those who have some authority have not sufficiently understood the problem.

CONSIDER what happened when the question arose of making the Pacific Coast secure against the Fifth Column. Mr. Bidle, with the best intentions in the world, based his first position on two legalistic and unworkable

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he was deliberately pulling the wool over some innocent visitor's eyes, pretended that this war could end, or that he meant to end it if he won, by his signing another peace treaty with his enemies. He has said, and what is much more important he has demonstrated by his actions, that his war can be victorious only if after defeating his enemies in the field he then captures them as peoples and makes them his allies, vassals, and agents.

WHAT HE REQUIRED of Yugoslavia, for example, was not merely that it adhere to the "New Order," but that it should become his ally in destroying the Greeks. If he conquers the Greeks on the mainland, he will press the Greeks to become his allies in despoiling the Turks, not merely to give up the idea of resisting, but in their turn to become his allies in the attack on the Middle East and Suez.

But the great example, which we shall fail to study at our extreme peril, is France—once the ally of Britain, then defeated, and then subjected to the cruellest pressure and also to the most insidious corruption in order to make France fight against Britain. No one need doubt the honorable intentions of Marshal Petain and Gen. Weygand. But only the dangerously naive will fail to realize that the Vichy government and its diplomatic missions abroad are infiltrated by Frenchmen who have staked their careers and their very lives on a Nazi victory. And only the blind will fail to see that what is in the making, if things go very badly with the British in the Mediterranean, is in some form or other the capture of the French Empire for the use of the Nazis in cutting the North Atlantic from the South Atlantic and forcing the more southern American republics into the orbit of Germany.

BUT THAT IS only part of the "unique scale" of the war. When Col. Lindbergh speaks so easily of a British defeat, he should study France today if he wishes seriously to comprehend what in fact Hitler would necessarily try to do with Britain if British resistance were overcome. Just as Hitler is forcing the French, though they still resist him because the British resist, to "collaborate" with him—that is, to help him win the war—so if he conquered the British Isles, he would use starvation and all manner of systematic oppression to force the British to submit to traitors and renegades who would help him to win his final campaign for the mastery of the world.

For until he has the mastery of the world in the sense that no one can oppose him or challenge him and there is no hope of liberation, none of his conquests can be maintained except by permanent occupation of more and more territory.

DID COL. LINDBERGH realize that to be defeated by Hitler is not merely to give up something and then return to the ordinary ways of peace, did he realize that the defeated nations have to become Hitler's allies for further conquests, the colonel would never have advised the American people as he did the other night in Chicago. He told us that because in his opinion Britain is "defeated," American support of Britain should be stopped.

Col. Lindbergh cannot have realized what he was saying. For leaving aside the consideration of honor and good faith, though a great people can never leave it aside, the adoption of his advice would not merely give the stab in the back which insured the absolute and catastrophic defeat of Britain. We should then have earned the everlasting enmity of all the British peoples and of all the other peoples who care for honor and for liberty. We should by this supreme act of desertion not only have isolated ourselves strategically among our avowed enemies, but we should have made ourselves the objects of a universal hatred and contempt throughout the world. If anyone thinks that after that we would be regarded as good neighbors by Canada or by any American republic, he knows nothing of the history of nations and less about the nature of man.

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Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

Col. Lindbergh Vs. Hitler

A DAY OR TWO after Col. Lindbergh had announced that Britain is defeated and the war practically over, Hitler in his



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birthday proclamation to the German people announced that "a heavy year of conflict stands before us" in which "historic decisions of unique scale will be made" entailing "immeasurable demands once again" on "our

mentfolk, our people of the German homeland." In the difference between these two estimates of what lies ahead there is all the difference between those who, like Col. Lindbergh, have never understood this war, and those who, like Hitler himself or his great antagonists—Churchill and Roosevelt—actually do understand this war.

For while superficially Col. Lindbergh and Hitler seem to agree, in that both expect a German victory, Hitler knows what Col. Lindbergh does not realize—that if there is to be a German victory, it can be won only on a "unique scale" after a prolonged and very costly conflict. What does Hitler mean when he says that he must win the war on a unique scale? He means that he cannot win the war on the small scale of his European victories. That if he is to win the war he must win it on a world scale. That is why, unlike Col. Lindbergh, he does not think the war is over and that is why, in spite of his Balkan victories, he tells the German people to steel themselves for a heavy year of conflict.

THE WHOLE OF Col. Lindbergh's misunderstanding of the war has arisen from two contradictory ideas—the one is that this is just another "European war" among European great powers in which the German Empire will defeat the British Empire and then take over some British colonies; the other is that Nazism, Fascism, and Communism are the wave of the future, destined to sweep Europe but not to cross the Atlantic Ocean. Hitler knows better. He knows that the revolutionary war he is waging cannot finally be won unless he not merely defeats all his opponents—which means that he must win not merely a European but a world war—but unless also by revolution he transforms his enemies into his more or less willing allies. Only by defeating all his opponents can he hope to make any of them his more or less willing allies. That is why Hitler realizes that he has no victory and that the conflict will go on to a decision on "a unique scale."

The scale of his war is unique, because as long as there are free countries which Hitler has not conquered, the nations he has conquered will continue to resist him, will conspire to defeat him, will regard as traitors those public men who work for him and with him. Thus he has defeated France, but the defeat cannot be made to stick unless by defeating Britain and America, too, he can bring into power a French government and make a French social order which will police the French nation for him and hold it in vassalage. Hitler realizes equally well what Col. Lindbergh has never grasped—that to defeat Britain he must defeat the British Empire throughout the world, and so completely annihilate the hope of resurrection and liberation that Britain in Europe and overseas can be governed by British Lays or British Quislings.

THE NAIVE VIEW of this war, which Col. Lindbergh expresses so forcefully, would have it that Hitler victory and a British defeat would be in effect a mere reversal of 1918, when there was an Allied victory and a German defeat. That is what leads the colonel and his patriotic followers to take such a detached and indifferent view of the outcome—to feel more or less that this is just one game in a long series of contests in which our favorite team won the last time, and the other team is winning this time. Hitler has never, except when

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THUS IT IS a fact which no student of American history can successfully dispute, that the foreign policy of Washington, Adams, Jefferson, and Monroe was not one bit more isolationist or noninterventionist than the policy of Roosevelt, Willkie, and Hull. The two policies are the same policy—the historic American policy since the foundation of the Republic. It is that the territories affecting our vital interests must not pass from the control of friendly and pacific nations into the control of aggressive and expanding empires, and that to prevent this happening we are prepared "to marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation" because this means "the union of two nations who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean."

There has been no change whatever in the principles of American foreign policy. If in 1802 we could not allow revolutionary France to control the mouth of the Mississippi, if in 1823 we could not allow Russia to control the western coast of Canada or the European Quadruple Alliance to reconquer Central and South America, then how can it be argued by Col. Lindbergh that in 1941 we are more aggressive than Hitler because we say that Hitler shall not control the islands of the Atlantic and the west coast of Africa? The distance in time from Washington to New Orleans in 1801, or from Chicago to South America in 1823, was very much greater than the distance today from the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands or Casablanca or Dakar to any part of the American continent. I have myself talked recently with a Canadian newspaperman who had dinner in Montreal and breakfast in England, having crossed the Atlantic in a bomber. Yet we are asked to believe that Jefferson who was aroused about French control of New Orleans, and Monroe and Jefferson who were aroused about the control of far-off South America, would today be unconcerned at the prospect of having Hitler established halfway across the Atlantic.

THE TRUTH is that those who appeal to the Fathers of the Republic in support of the Lindbergh propaganda are misrepresenting totally the principles and the actions of the Fathers of the Republic. The first American statesmen were not pacifists. They were not isolationists. They were not neutrals. They had not been afraid to fight against England but neither were they in the slightest afraid to say that they would, if American interests were threatened, fight along with England.

Thus it may be said, quite literally and seriously, that though the present foreign policy of the United States Government is not in accord with the views of the America First Committee, it is strictly in accord with the principles and the practice of the first Americans.

Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

The First Americans And Their Policy

ALTHOUGH there are some who think it far-fetched and meddlesome for the United States Government to take an interest in the fate of the French, Spanish, and Portuguese empires, they would not think so if they had studied American history. For the line of policy announced by the President on May 28, and now being followed by Secretary Hull in his



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negotiations, was in fact inaugurated under President John Adams and while Washington was still alive. In 1793 during the wars of revolutionary imperialism the question arose which has now, with Hitler's Germany in place of Napoleonic France, arisen again: It was learned that conquering France was about to gain control of the weakly-held Spanish empire which then included the Louisiana territory, Florida, Central and South America.

The news was communicated on February 15, 1793, by Lord Grenville to Rufus King, the United States Minister in London, saying as King reported it, that "if Spain should be able to preserve her independence and prevent a revolution in her government," Great Britain would let the Spanish empire alone; "but if it was really to be apprehended Spain should fall beneath the control of France" then the British government "would endeavor to prevent France from gaining to their cause the resources of South America" and would "immediately open their views and commence a negotiation upon the subject with the United States." There was some doubt then, as there is now about Vichy, as to whether Spain had really surrendered and was collaborating with the revolutionary conqueror. But by September of the same year the British were telling Rufus King that there "could be no doubt that France had obtained a cession" of the Louisiana territory and King was saying in London that we should "be unwilling that Louisiana should pass into the hands of new proprietors."

United States can continue long friends when they meet in so terrible a position. . . The day that France takes possession of New Orleans fixes the sentence which is to retain her forever within her low-water mark. It seals the union of two nations who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. . . This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us as necessarily as any other cause, by the laws of nature, brings on its necessary effect."

SHORTLY after this, by a secret treaty signed October 1, 1800, Spain did cede Louisiana to Napoleon, though for more than a year this was stoutly denied by the Spanish and the French. The United States continued to negotiate with Great Britain and the position taken about the Spanish possessions was identical with that which we have now taken in regard to the French, Spanish and Portuguese possessions in the Western Hemisphere or confront in it, and in regard to the control of the seas.

The policy was formulated by President Jefferson in his instruction of April 18, 1802, to Livingston, the United States Minister in Paris: "The cession of Louisiana and the Floridas by Spain to France works most sorely on the United States." New Orleans, he pointed out, is one of the gateways to our territory. France, placing herself in that door assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might have retained it quietly for years. These circumstances render it impossible that France and the

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THAT is the question on which the people, as the final judges, must deliver a verdict. They must decide whether the peril of war originates in Berlin and Tokyo or in Washington. For the whole collision of opinions between isolationists and interventionists, between the America First Committee and the Fight For Freedom Committee, between Senator Wheeler and President Roosevelt, between Mr. Landon and his former running mate, Mr. Knox, between Mr. Hoover and Mr. Stimson, between Col. Lindbergh and Mr. Willkie, is a controversy between those who say that the real warmongers are in Berlin and in Tokyo.

This is the issue, and the verdict is of supreme practical importance. If, as the isolationists argue, the real warmongers are in Washington and not in Berlin and Tokyo, then it is not only right but necessary to obstruct and weaken the Administration in all possible ways. The more completely Congress can tie the President's hands, the more it can reduce his power, the more it can persuade the rest of the world that the United States will never intervene, will never take strong measures, the more goodwill we shall arouse in Tokyo and in the heart of Adolf Hitler. If the real warmongers are in Washington, then the way to have peace is for Americans to paralyze their own Government.

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BUT if the verdict of the people is that the real warmongers are in Berlin and Tokyo, then what we need for our security is not a weak American Government, but the strongest possible American Government. Then it is a very dangerous business to weaken the American Government and to reduce its influence and to tie its hands. For if the warmongers are not in Washington but in Berlin and Tokyo, then the way to serve this country is to take measures which will, if and when it comes to a slowdown, provide us with the strongest forces, the best allies and the more favorable positions. If the breeding place of the war is abroad, then what we need is power, and the strongest allies we can enlist, and the strategic places, and all the other ingredients of victory.

For if the peril of war originates not here at home but in the capitals of the great aggressor states, then we must lead from strength and not from weakness. For only by strength can the peril of full war conceivably be averted at all and, if it cannot be averted, then ended quickly and decisively.

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Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

The Colliding Opinions

IF FREE SPEECH is not to generate into mere shouting and name-calling, we shall have to define this issue and debate it.



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For the right of everyone to say anything he pleases is only the beginning, and it is not the end of freedom of speech. The end and purpose of free speech is to arrive at the truth by a meeting of minds in open debate. If

experience had not shown that freedom men get at more of the truth and are able to reach surer conclusions for their actions than under despotism, the case for freedom of speech would not be impressive.

That is why, as a matter of fact, certain underlying disgust with liberty had developed in those countries—for example, in pre-war France and in pre-Fascist Italy—where the press was corrupt, the Parliament irresponsible and demagogic, public utterance malicious, tricky and cunning. The right to freedom of speech did not produce honest debate which ended in practical decisions, and this failure of liberty, this spectacle of corruption, ineptitude and paralysis, caused men to lose faith in liberty and to defend it weakly, and wearily to surrender it. There is no lasting vigor in freedom of speech unless men insist upon the virtue of free speech: unless mere loud speaking, mere public uttering, mere broadcasting and declaiming are brought down to truth and reality by cross-examination and debate, by issuing statements, delivering speeches, writing articles and then making Gallup Polls are not the whole of free speech: the fulfillment of freedom of speech is debate which compels the speaker to prove his case or change his position.

ON the great question before us in America we are not having a debate: we are having a collision of vehemently uttered opinions. This collision arises from two diametrically opposed assumptions as to the reason why America is nearer and nearer to war. The one view is that the victories of Germany and Japan, their alliances and their intrigues and their penetration into various parts of the world, are compelling the United States to take increasingly strong measures for the defense of its vital interests. This is the view of the President and of his Cabinet, which includes Mr. Stimson, who was the last Republican Secretary of State, and of Mr. Knox, who was the Republican candidate for Vice President in 1936, and it is the view also of Mr. Willkie, who was the Republican candidate for President in 1940.

The other view is that America is coming nearer to war, not because of what is being done in Europe, in Asia, in Africa and in South America by Germany and Japan, but because of what Mr.

Roosevelt, Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox and Mr. Willkie are doing in the United States. This is the burden of Senator Wheeler's argument, and of Mr. Landon's, and, to some degree, of Mr. Hoover's. The real question at issue, therefore, is whether the United States is on the verge of war because of the acts of foreign governments, or because of the acts of the United States Government.

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for American defense which require the taxes which are causing the inflation that has to be controlled, which are causing the trouble in the nondefense industries. It is a plain misrepresentation of the truth to say that the sacrifices the people must make are due to the policy of aiding the Allies. Those sacrifices were ordered by the Congress of the United States over a year ago when Hitler conquered France. They were ordered many months before anybody had thought of lease-lend, which was not voted until last winter.

THE second point which has to be grasped is that there is just one way to get to the end of these tremendous expenditures and of all they carry with them in the sacrifice of our normal way of life. That is by a victory over the aggressors which makes it safe for the United States to demobilize down to a reasonable military establishment. The fatal flaw in the case of the America First Committee, and even in that of Mr. Hoover and Mr. Landon, is that they do not promise and that they cannot promise any end to the business of a total mobilization of the United States for war.

Their position is that if we have an impregnable defense, we can afford to let the Nazi-Japanese alliance conquer Europe and Asia and Africa. They say we cannot be invaded, and that this Hemisphere can be defended, and that we can even do business with the victorious alliance, provided we make our own armed forces strong enough. When our defense program is in full operation we shall be spending at the rate of 36 to 40 billion a year on it, what the isolationists offer us is the prospect of being able to live on in a totalitarian world if, year after year and for an indefinite future, we spend at least that much every year.

So the America First Committee should explain to the American people whether, in case of a Hitler victory, they propose to maintain our defenses or to reduce them. And they might then explain how they expect to do business with Hitler if we are not tremendously armed, or how, if they believe we have to remain tremendously armed for ever and ever, they think we can hope to return to a free economy.

IT IS time that the loyal opposition faced the realities and stopped confusing the public mind. It is time it stopped saying or implying that our burdens are due to our aiding the Allies. Our burdens are due to a defense program voted by the overwhelming majority of Congress before there was any aid to the Allies, voted as a matter of historic fact when the country thought the Allies would be defeated. The plain truth is that our defense burdens are due not to the interventionist policy, which came much later, but to the fear that we might find ourselves isolated in the kind of world which the isolationists are prepared to accept. If anyone wishes to estimate the cost of the isolationist policy he can find the figure in the Congressional appropriations that were voted when we were threatened with perfect isolation.

It is time to stop talking as if we thought that by letting the Nazi-Japanese combination win the war, we could somehow have done with conscription and high taxes and Government regulation of business and return to the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover era. If the Allies lose this war, if the isolationists prevail here and prevent us from preventing a totalitarian victory, the defense effort we are now making will have to go on, not two or three or four years, but for the rest of our lives, and we shall never be able to return to a normal existence.

THAT is why, the more they understand it, the more completely the American people will reject the isolationist argument.

Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

No Relief Without Victory

ALL the signs are now clearly visible that we have reached a turning point in the defense program. It has taken us 12 months to reach it. We are



passing from appropriations, contracts, plant expansion and tooling up to production and delivery. During the first phase we generated a domestic boom but produced only a meager supply of weapons of war. We are now at the stage where, as

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All of these are merely aspects of the same fundamental and obvious fact—namely that as an increasing part of the productive energy of the Nation is devoted to defense, there must be a diminishing supply of goods for civilians.

So we have heavy taxes, which will have to be made still heavier and reinforced. I believe, by compulsory saving, to curtail the purchasing power of civilians.

So we have a rising cost of living, which means that because the people are spending more money for goods which are becoming scarcer, they are paying higher prices without getting more goods. What the tax collector does not take and what the private individual does not save is taken by a disguised and automatic form of taxation—a rise in prices.

So we have shut-downs and unemployment in nondefense plants because, in the last analysis, though the distress can be alleviated somewhat by a more flexible administration of priorities, there just are not enough basic materials to complete the defense program and carry on business as usual.

National defense, in short, has to be paid for. It is paid for not in "money" but by working harder and by doing without many things that ordinarily can be bought with money.

THE willingness of the people to bear the burdens, the capacity of industry and of Government to do successfully what must be done, depend upon a clear understanding of what is being done and why. The unholy mess, which the Administration has made of the oil shortage in the East shows what happens when there is no clear policy and no competent effort to explain it to the people. The problems which are now arising are much more complicated and general than the Eastern oil shortage.

THE first point which has to be made indisputably clear is that our internal difficulties do not arise out of lease-lend and the policy of aiding Britain and China. They rise out of the authorizations and appropriations of Congress for American defense, and if nothing were lease-lent to Britain, if we had a purely American first foreign policy, our taxes, our troubles with inflation, our civilian shortages except in minor respects, the unemployment due to priorities, our labor difficulties would be just as troublesome.

Out of 60 billions available for war purposes, about 50 billions are for American defense projects authorized by very nearly unanimous votes in Congress. The other ten billions consist of the seven billions for lease-lend and something over three billions of British money earmarked for British contracts placed in the United States. No isolationist and no authorized member of the America First Committee has ever challenged the 50 billions for national defense.

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his Republican friends did not intend to defeat the Army extension bill. They meant to "teach Mr. Roosevelt a lesson" and show their own strength by letting the bill pass only by the narrowest margin: at the last moment they were in a panic when it appeared that they might succeed only too well and have enough votes to defeat the bill. For they no more meant to wreck the Army than Mr. Lewis means to wreck the armament program: the Republican politicians were only staging a political strike to gain what they thought would be a political advantage.

SO MR. LEWIS should not be singled out as the specially appointed scapegoat. He is in eminently respectable company, and nothing he has done is in any way inconsistent with the views of his associates in the August 5 declaration, or with the action of the Republican organization in the House.

If the Hoover-Lewis view of the war and the national security is sound, then the mine workers are not striking against the national interest when they strike against the steel companies; they are doing only what, in the absence of the national emergency, they would normally do. If Mr. Martin was justified in defying the President, the Secretary of War, and the Chief of Staff on the critical question of Army service, then Mr. Lewis is doing nothing more reprehensible when he defies the President on the critical question of production to provide weapons for the armed forces.

IT IS NECESSARY to insist upon this—the background—of Mr. Lewis' action because only with these things in mind can we see the fundamental issue. The issue is not labor unionism, or the union shop, or the labor policies of the New Deal, or the labor policies of the steel companies but whether the isolationist position can any longer be reconciled with the defense of American security. On this fundamental issue we have now come to a showdown. Mr. Lewis would not be striking if he were not an isolationist, if he did not believe that our foreign policy is wrong and that there is, therefore, no urgent need for an all-out effort of total defense. This is the position of Mr. Martin and his Republican followers. And this, though they shrink from the consequences, is the position of Mr. Hoover and Mr. Landon when they stake their influence on the view that America is not involved in the war and has no vital interest in the outcome of the war.

It is impossible in practice to reconcile the isolationist position with total defense, even though theoretically most of the isolationist leaders approve the idea of national defense. For if the isolationists are right, if the country is not threatened by the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo alliance, if the defeat of Britain, China and Russia would not be a threat to the security and the vital interests of America, if our greatest danger comes not from Hitler but from Mr. Roosevelt, then the scale and scope and intensity of the effort for national defense are absurd.

IF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE effort is unnecessary, then it is wrong to conscript men, it is wrong to appropriate 60 billions, it is wrong to levy huge taxes, it is wrong to institute priorities, it is wrong to object to labor's striking for advantages. It is impossible to ask the country to make these sacrifices if men as eminent as Mr. Hoover, and a party as respectable as the Republican Party, continue to argue that there does not exist a danger real and great enough to call for such sacrifices. The issue, then, is broader and deeper than the mechanics of labor relations, than devices, legalities, and all other matters of ways and means. The question at issue is the national will of the American people. For only when that will is clear, can the ways and means be found to serve it.

So the showdown is necessary. A decision must be taken by the Nation as to whether or not the Republic is in danger, as to whether or not, therefore, we are to have national unity and national discipline such as a great occasion requires, or whether we are to have business-as-usual, politics-as-usual, labor unionism-as-usual. Until we have settled that issue, we cannot settle conclusively and effectively any other issue. We are at the end of debating and the time of decision is at hand. We have to know now what we think and what we mean to do, and what course, having taken our decision, it will be the duty of all men to support.

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Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

The Showdown Has Come

MR. JOHN L. LEWIS would certainly agree that if the country is in peril, no loyal citizen would dream of closing down the



coal mines and of threatening to stop the production of steel. The only conceivable explanation of what Mr. Lewis has done is, therefore, that he has searched his conscience and does not believe that the emergency is critical

LIPPMANN enough to make it the duty of every man to rally to the defense of his country.

On no other ground could he, or would he, attempt to justify his action. The strike he has called involves no question which can possibly be described by him as of such vital and urgent importance to the miners that they will be irreparably injured if the settlement is postponed because it takes time to negotiate or arbitrate it.

THE QUESTION is whether in coal mines owned by the steel companies, in the so-called "captive mines," there shall be the same kind of union shop as there is in almost all the rest of the mining industry. In itself the demand of the miners is certainly not unreasonable. But since these captive mines have been operated for years without the union shop, Mr. Lewis should explain to the country why he feels justified in saying that on October 27, 1941, it became so important to have the union shop in these mines that, rather than permit delay for negotiations, a crippling blow must be struck at the national defense.

There is no explanation for Mr. Lewis to say that he does not like the Mediation Board, or Mr. Hillman, or the President. For what is at stake is the defense of the United States—a far greater thing than any man, be his name Roosevelt, or Hillman, or Lewis. Since Mr. Lewis will not and cannot deny that his action is a blow at the national defense, there is only one explanation he can offer as a loyal citizen of this country. It is that he thinks defense is not the most important business of Americans, that the emergency proclaimed by the President and recognized by the unprecedented appropriations of Congress is not in fact critical, and that private interests are quite justified in behaving as if no supreme national interest were at stake.

AS A MATTER OF FACT this is just what Mr. Lewis does believe, and he is fully entitled to say that he does not stand alone, that on the contrary he is doing nothing which is not the logical and justifiable consequence of the position taken by men of unimpeachable loyalty and of proved conservatism. On August 5 Mr. Lewis was invited to join ex-President Hoover, ex-Vice President Dawes, ex-Governor Lowden, and Mr. Alf Landon in a public statement which declared that "few people honestly believe that the Axis is now, or will in the future be, in a position to threaten the independence of any part of this hemisphere if our defenses are properly prepared." Obviously, if this is true, if these Republican leaders are right that there is no imminent and no serious threat to the security of this hemisphere, then a strike which tied up the steel industry for a few weeks would be at worst an inconvenience.

Seven days afterwards, on August 12, the Republican organization in the House of Representatives placed itself on record before the country and the world as believing that, despite the urgent pleas of the Chief of Staff, it was safe to dislocate the organization of our partially-trained Army. At a matter of fact, Mr. Martin and

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peace could be bought by inciting a German-Russian war was disastrously wrong. Permitting, in fact inviting, Hitler to make war on Russia did not produce the war against Russia which, in Col. Lindbergh's view, it should have meant.

What it did was to make Russia an undeclared enemy of Britain and France, and in the critical period from 1939 to 1941, something very near to an ally of Hitler. Col. Lindbergh's idea, which was also that of the British and French appeasers, was that Britain and France could buy safety and time to arm by inviting Hitler to attack Russia. This idea, as dishonorable as it was foolish, was the boomerang which made it safe for Hitler to go to war, knowing that he need not fear the hostility of Stalin or bother about the Russian army until he had disposed of the French army.

COL. LINDBERGH cannot represent himself as the prophet who was not listened to. The historical record refutes his present image of himself as the disregarded prophet. He was listened to, and the policy he advocated was followed. Mr. Chamberlain tried to do exactly what Col. Lindbergh says he should have done. He tried to push Hitler eastward against Russia while Britain armed, and while Britain hoped that Hitler would become too exhausted in Russia to attack Britain. What Col. Lindbergh did not foresee, what even with hindsight he does not yet see, is that once Britain and France had been separated from Russia, it was as much Stalin's interest as Hitler's to have Germany "expand" first towards the west rather than towards the east.

Thus the "conclusion" Col. Lindbergh had come to in 1938 was, as the event has shown, a complete miscalculation both as regards Hitler and Stalin. And the tragedy of Europe is not that Col. Lindbergh's conclusions were disregarded but that they were accepted by the ruling classes of Britain and France.

IT IS Col. Lindbergh who has learned nothing from experience, not even from the events in which he himself played a not inconsiderable part. Thinking that his advice to abandon Russia in 1938 and invite Hitler to attack Russia was disregarded, when in fact it was adopted at Munich, he still thinks that the way to preserve the peace is to invite Hitler to destroy all his opponents one by one. That is Col. Lindbergh's advice to us today. He wants to go on doing what Mr. Chamberlain, fortified by his own advice, did in 1938—to deliver to Hitler one by one the nations capable of resisting him.

Thus, having been in favor of a Nazi attack on Russia in 1938 as a means of preserving "peace," he would now abandon Russia to Hitler, and he would now abandon Britain to Hitler, and he would now abandon China to Hitler's ally—all for the sake of peace and in the name of peace.

If he can now succeed in doing in the United States what in 1938 he did in Britain and France, he will once more separate Russia from Britain, and then he will separate Britain from America. The practical consequence now would again be what it was after 1938—not to preserve the peace but to make certain that Hitler did not have to fight more than one great power at a time.

AND SO when he says that "after two years of war we are in a better position to judge the policies that were followed by England and France," he is quite right. But he might add that we are also in a better position to judge the policy advocated by Col. Lindbergh since 1938.

Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

Lindbergh As Prophet

SPEAKING in New York on Thursday evening Col. Lindbergh appealed to his own record on the war, arguing that what has happened in Europe is due to the fact that his advice was disregarded. If this is true, if Col. Lindbergh is in fact the far-seeing, expert observer and political prophet who was disregarded, then his views on the present situation do indeed have very great weight.



LIPPMANN

Here, in his own words, is his version of what happened:

"By 1938 I had come to the conclusion that if a war occurred between Germany on one side, and England and France on the other, it would result either in a German victory or in a prostrate and devastated Europe. I therefore advocated that England and France build their military forces with the utmost rapidity, but that they permit Germany to expand eastward into Russia without declaring war.

"As you know the opposite school of thought prevailed."

Col. Lindbergh's memory has failed him. The views he held in 1938 were not disregarded. They were followed by the Chamberlain government in Britain and by M. Georges Bonnet, the Foreign Minister of France. The advice which Col. Lindbergh gave the British and French governments was not disregarded. "The opposite school of thought" did not prevail. Col. Lindbergh's school of thought prevailed, and as a result Chamberlain and Daladier went to Munich in September, 1938, and signed the Munich pact.

AT MUNICH, Messrs. Chamberlain and Daladier did exactly what Col. Lindbergh says they should have done. They excluded Russia from the Munich conference. They compelled Czechoslovakia to surrender its defenses, which were the strongest in eastern Europe, then, having isolated Russia, they did exactly what Col. Lindbergh thinks they should have done. They declared to Hitler and served notice on Stalin that "they would permit Germany to expand eastward into Russia without declaring war."

If Col. Lindbergh had judged Hitler and the European situation correctly, the Munich pact should have meant that Hitler would, thereafter, have improved his relations with Britain and France while he prepared "to expand eastward into Russia." But in fact Hitler did not do what Col. Lindbergh's prophecy required Hitler to do. Within a fortnight of Munich, Hitler delivered a violent speech against Britain, going so far as to name the British public men who, in his opinion, should not be allowed to hold office. He began to make demands, not on Russia, but on Britain and France for a redistribution of their African empires, and his agents were at work fomenting insurrection in the Middle East.

IN OTHER WORDS the effect of Munich was the exact opposite of what Mr. Chamberlain, and incidentally Col. Lindbergh, planned and expected. Hitler did not turn against Russia. On the contrary, having separated Russia from Britain and France, he could ignore Russia for the time being, could even prepare a temporary agreement with Russia, while he devoted his attention, first, to separating the French army from the Polish, and then to separating Britain from France. Thus, though it is a debatable question whether Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and Russia could or should have resisted Hitler before Munich, it is absolutely certain that Col. Lindbergh's theory that

Mr. K. A. Towns ✓
Mr. Clegg ✓
Mr. Glavin ✓
Mr. Ladd ✓
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Mr. Tracy ✓
Mr. Rosen ✓
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Mr. Holloman ✓
Mr. Quinn Tamm ✓
Mr. Nease ✓
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Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

Mr. Nelson's Authority

THERE IS a difference of opinion, which needs to be examined further, among those who very earnestly wish to accomplish the same result. It is as to whether



LIPPMANN

head of it given Cabinet rank.

It appears from what Mr. Krock wrote in the New York Times on Friday that Mr. Baruch thinks the Executive order alone will put Mr. Nelson in the stronger position, and this view is shared by Mr. Mark Sullivan. The other view, which is held by many men of experience and proven foresight both inside and outside the present Administration, is that for the long pull, when the honeymoon period of enthusiastic publicity is over, it will be found highly advisable to have given Mr. Nelson's office and his powers a more solid statutory foundation.

THERE IS, it must be emphasized, no disagreement here about the objective but only a difference of opinion about ways and means. All are agreed that the task of procurement and production should be under the final control of a chief of supply, to whom are delegated all the necessary powers now dispersed among many departments and agencies or vested in the President. All are pleased that there is not to be another board because, as Woodrow Wilson once said, a board is almost always long, narrow, and wooden. All are now agreed that the President is now intending to give Mr. Nelson the necessary powers, and that Mr. Nelson is an excellent choice.

All are agreed, moreover, that Mr. Nelson will need all the authority with which he can be invested. It is at this point that the difference of opinion begins. Mr. Baruch's view is, so we are told, that "with a confirming Executive order and steady support by the President," Mr. Nelson will out-rank everyone but the President in authority over production and procurement. "He will not be put in a par with Cabinet officers because that would reduce his general authority," Mr. Mark Sullivan states the view in even stronger terms. "The kind of authority Mr. Nelson needs is that which is expressed not in formal

rank, nor official documents, but in the personal attitude of the President." If the White House circle "are made to understand that Mr. Nelson has Presidential authority and confidence, then Mr. Nelson will have authority. If the President should happen, by so faint a sign as a fleeting facial expression, to show any abatement of confidence in Mr. Nelson, then Mr. Nelson's prestige will vanish, and with it his authority and effectiveness."

WHAT MR. SULLIVAN has said here is, I fear, the exact truth, and this is precisely why many, who have been praying over this problem a long time, have come to the conclusion that Mr. Nelson's

office should be founded upon something stronger than the "fleeting facial expressions" of the President. They hold that this office, second only to that of the President, should be founded on statutory law as the only known form of guaranty against the fluctuations of personal favor.

They believe that the authority of Mr. Nelson over the supply branches of the War and the Navy Departments and over the other relevant agencies should not be solely dependent from day to day, from hour to hour, upon the President's favor. They hold also that the President's favor will be more steadfast if Mr. Nelson's office has been established by Congressional statute, and reinforced by the legislative and the popular support which that entails.

TO THOSE who say, as Mr. Krock reports Mr. Baruch as saying, that with Presidential favor Mr. Nelson will be superior to the Cabinet, those who hold the other view would say in reply that authority is precarious and fragile when it depends solely upon favor. They would say to Mr. Baruch that an arrangement which worked fairly well in the latter stages of the other war is not necessarily the best arrangement for this war, that Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt are not the same man.

They would say also that a close observation of affairs during the past 18 months has convinced many men that the established departments of Government are more powerful, in the long run, day in and day out, in the details, which really control the result, than are the improvised agencies which rise and fall by Presidential favor, have no settled and statutory existence or procedure, and are operated on an emergency

basis. Many a policy approved by the White House and entrusted with much publicity to a temporary official without clear rank or authority has become bogged down, snarled in red tape, sterilized by bureaucratic inertia, while the President, who is a busy man, has turned his attention to new problems, thinking he has settled the matter.

FOR THESE REASONS it will be unwise to dismiss too easily, saying that "there is little in that," the suggestion that when Mr. Nelson's office has been set up by Executive order and with the President's full favor, this temporary structure should be solidified and reinforced by the statutory creation of a department of supply. Such a department would, of course, have Cabinet rank, the rank being the outer aspect of the inner substance, namely, the true delegation of power over procurement and production from the President and from many departments and agencies to one powerful department of Government.

Is there really any other way by which the President can actually divest himself of a responsibility that he cannot hope to exercise while he is Commander in Chief and the leader of the Nation? Is there any other way— if so it should be proposed— by which the delegation of power to Mr. Nelson's office, that is to Mr. Nelson or his successors, will be substantial, convincing and durable?

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Mr. Holloman
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Mr. Nease
Miss Gandy

Mr. Cunningham
Mr. Fitch
Mr. Kimball
Mr. Kramer
Mr. Strickland
Mr. Tamm

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moment all about enemy aliens, dual citizenship, naturalized citizens, native citizens of enemy alien parentage, and consider a warship in San Francisco harbor, an airplane plant in Los Angeles, a general's headquarters at Oshkosh, and an admiral's at Podunk. Then think of the lineal descendant, if there happened to be such a person, of George Washington, the father of his country, and consider what happens to Mr. Washington if he decides he would like to visit the warship, or take a walk in the airplane plant, or to drop in and photograph the general and the admiral in their quarters.

He is stopped by the sentry. He has to prove who he is. He has to prove that he has a good reason for doing what he wishes to do. He has to register, sign papers, and wear an identification button. Then perhaps, if he proves his case, he is escorted by an armed guard while he does his errand, and until he has been checked out of the place and his papers and his button have been returned. Have Mr. Washington's constitutional rights been abridged?

Has he been denied the dignity of the human person? Has his loyalty been impugned?

NOW IT SEEMS to me that this is in principle and in general the procedure which ought to be used for all persons in a zone which the military authorities regard as open to enemy attack. In that zone, as in the corridors of the general's headquarters or on the deck of the warship or within the gates of the airplane plant, everyone should be compelled to prove that he has a good reason for being there, and no one should be allowed to come and go until he has proved that his business is necessary and consistent with the national defense.

In the vital and vulnerable areas it should be the rule that residence, employment, communication by telephone, telegraph, automobile and railroad are confined to licensed persons who are fully identified and whose activities are fully known to the authorities and to their neighbors. The Pacific Coast is officially a combat zone: Some part of it may at any moment be a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on a battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battlefield who has no good reason for being there. There is plenty of room elsewhere for him to exercise his rights.

THIS IS IN SUBSTANCE the system of policing which necessarily prevails in a war zone. By this system the constitutional and international questions about aliens and citizens do not arise at the very place where they confuse the issues and prevent the taking of thorough measures of security. Under this system all persons are in principle treated alike. As a matter of national policy there is no discrimination. But at the same time the authorities on the spot in the threatened region are able to act decisively, and let the explanations and the reparations come later.

This approach to the question by-passes the problem which, as I see it, has caused the trouble in Washington. For what Washington has been trying to find is a policy for dealing with all enemy aliens everywhere and all potential Fifth Columnists everywhere. Yet a policy which may be wise in most parts of the country may be extremely fool-hardy in a combat zone.

Therefore, much the best thing to do is to recognize the Western combat zone as territory quite different from the rest of the country, and then to set up in that zone a special regime. This has been done on the Bataan Peninsula, in Hawaii, in Alaska, in the Canal zone. Why not also on the threatened West Coast of the United States?

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Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

The Fifth Column On The Coast

SAN FRANCISCO.—The enemy alien problem on the Pacific Coast, or much more accurately the Fifth Column problem, is

very serious and it is very special. What makes it so serious and so special is that the Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from within and from without.

LIPPMANN The danger is not, as it would be in the inland centers or perhaps even for the present on the Atlantic Coast, from sabotage alone. The peculiar danger of the Pacific Coast is in a Japanese raid accompanied by enemy action inside American territory.

This combination can be very formidable indeed. For while the striking power of Japan from the sea and air might not in itself be overwhelming at any one point just now, Japan could strike a blow which might do irreparable damage if it were accompanied by the kind of organized sabotage to which this part of the country is specially vulnerable.

This is a sober statement of the situation, in fact a report, based not on speculation but on what is known to have taken place and to be taking place in this area of the war. It is a fact that the Japanese navy has been reconnoitering the Pacific Coast more or less continually and for a considerable period of time, testing and feeling out the American defenses. It is a fact that communication takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy agents on land.

These are facts which we shall ignore or minimize at our peril. It is also a fact that since the outbreak of the Japanese war there has been no important sabotage on the Pacific Coast.

From what we know about Hawaii and about the Fifth Column in Europe this is not as some have liked to think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is well organized and that it is held back until it can be struck with maximum effect.

IN PREPARING TO REPEL the attack the Army and Navy have all the responsibility but they are facing it with one hand tied down in Washington. I am sure I understand fully and appreciate thoroughly the unwillingness of Washington to adopt a policy of mass evacuation and mass internment of all those who are technically enemy aliens. But I submit that Washington is not defining the problem on the Pacific Coast correctly and that therefore it is raising insoluble issues unnecessarily and failing to deal with the practical issues promptly. No one ever can hope to get the right answer unless he first asks the right questions.

The official approach to the danger is through a series of unrealities. There is the assumption that it is a problem of "enemy aliens." As a matter of fact it is certainly also a problem of native-born American citizens. There is the assumption that a citizen may not be interfered with unless he has committed an overt act, or at least unless there is strong evidence that he is about to commit an overt act.

There is the assumption that if the rights of a citizen are abridged anywhere, they have been abridged everywhere. The effect of these assumptions has been to precipitate legalistic and ideological arguments between the military authorities out here and the civil authorities in Washington, and between the aroused citizenry of the coast and their fellow-countrymen in the interior.

A MUCH SIMPLER approach, will, I believe, yield much more practical results. Forget for a

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February 13, 1942

Fifth Column on the Coast

By WALTER LIPPMANN

San Francisco, Feb. 13.
THE ENEMY alien problem on the Pacific Coast, or much more accurately the fifth column problem, is very serious and it is very special. What makes it so serious and so special is that the Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from within and from without. The danger is not, as it would be in the inland centers or perhaps even for the present on the Atlantic Coast, from sabotage alone. The peculiar danger of the Pacific Coast is in a Japanese raid accompanied by enemy action inside American territory. This combination can be very formidable indeed. For while the striking power of Japan from the sea and air might not in itself be overwhelming at any one point just now, Japan could strike a blow which might do irreparable damage if it were accompanied by the kind of organized sabotage to which this part of the country is specially vulnerable.

In preparing to repel the attack the Army and Navy have all the responsibility but they are facing it with one hand tied down in Washington. I am sure I understand fully and appreciate thoroughly the unwillingness of Washington to adopt a policy of mass evacuation and mass internment of all those who are technically enemy aliens. But I submit that Washington is not defining the problem on the Pacific Coast correctly and that therefore it is raising insoluble issues unnecessarily and failing to deal with the practical issues promptly. No one ever can hope to get the right answer unless he first asks the right questions.

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born American citizens. There is the assumption that a citizen may not be interfered with unless he has committed an overt act, or at least unless there is strong evidence that he is about to commit an overt act. There is the assumption that if the rights of a citizen are abridged anywhere, they have been abridged everywhere. The effect of these assumptions has been to precipitate legalistic and ideological arguments between the military authorities out here and the civil authorities in Washington, and between the aroused citizenry of the coast and their fellow-countrymen in the interior.

A much simpler approach will, I believe, yield much more practical results. Forget for a moment all about enemy aliens, dual citizenship, naturalized citizens, native citizens of enemy alien parentage, and consider a warship in San Francisco Harbor, an airplant in Los Angeles, a general's headquarters at Oshkosh and an admiral's at Podunk. Then think of the lineal descendant, if there happened to be such a person, of George Washington the Father of His Country, and consider what happens to Mr. Washington if he decides he would like to visit the warship, or take a walk in the airplane plant, or to drop in and photograph the general and the admiral in their quarters.

He is stopped by the sentry. He has to prove who he is. He has to prove that he has a good reason for doing what he wishes to do. He has to register, sign papers, and wear an identification button. Then perhaps, if he proves his case he is escorted by an armed guard while he does his errand, and until he has checked out of the place and his papers and his button have been returned. Have Mr. Washington's constitutional rights been abridged? Has he been denied the dignity of the human person? Has his loyalty been impugned?

Now, it seems to me that this is in principle and in general the procedure which ought to be used for all persons in a zone which the military authorities regard as open to enemy attack. In that zone, as in the corridors of the general's headquarters or on the deck of the warship or within the gates of the airplane plant, every one should be compelled to prove that he has a good reason for being there, and no one should be allowed to come and go until he has proved that his business is necessary and consistent with the national defense.

In the vital and vulnerable areas it should be the rule that residence, employment, communication by telephone, telegraph, automobile and railroad are confined to licensed persons who are fully identified and whose activities are fully known to the authorities and to their neighbors.

The Pacific Coast is officially a combat zone; some part of it may at any moment be a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on a battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battlefield who has no good reason for being there. There is plenty of room elsewhere for him to exercise his rights.

This approach to the question by-passes the problem which, as I see it, has caused the trouble in Washington. For what Washington has been trying to find is a policy for dealing with all enemy aliens everywhere and all potential fifth columnists everywhere. Yet a policy which may be wise in most parts of the country may be extremely foolhardy in a combat zone. Therefore, much the best thing to do is to recognize the western combat zone as territory quite different from the rest of the country, and then to set up in that zone a special regime. —(c1942.)

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WESTBROOK PEGLER

Chicago, Ill.,
Feb. 14.—Walter Lippmann is one of our best known syndicated

cosmic columnists, distinctly on the scholarly or doubledome side and a conscientious and responsible man. He is not known as a news-and-fact reporter, however, so he gave me a start Thursday when he wrote from San Francisco a piece that seemed to me to be a cry of alarm.

His trouble in the role of Paul Revere is his reputation as an essayist. People read his column as required study in difficult subjects, so I imagine that they mistook his siren for the one on the battalion chief's car tooling the skipper through the traffic to date for lunch. I imagine that because what Lippmann said that day belonged in no column over near the editorial matter but under a black line outside.

Tightened up a little bit, this is what he said:

"The enemy alien or fifth column problem on the Pacific Coast is very serious. The coast is in imminent danger of combined attack from within and from without. The peculiar danger is in a Japanese raid accompanied by enemy action inside American territory. The combination can be very formidable. For, while the striking power might not be overwhelming at any one point, Japan might do irreparable damage if it were accompanied by sabotage to which this part of the country is especially vulnerable."

"This is a sober report based on what is known to be taking place. The Japanese navy has been reconnoitering the Pacific Coast, testing and feeling out the defenses. Communication takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy agents on land. There has been no important sabotage, but this is no sign that there is nothing to fear. It is a sign that the blow is well organized and held back until it can be struck with maximum effect."

From that Lippmann goes on to urge the mass evacuation and mass internment of enemy aliens, most of whom, of course, are Japanese.

What It Means

Do you get what he says? This is a high-grade fellow, with a heavy sense of responsibility, trying to tell us that the enemy has been scouting our coast, a fact unknown to our people; that the Japs ashore are communicating with the enemy offshore and that on the basis of "what is known to be taking place" there are signs that a well-organized blow is being withheld only until it can do the most damage. That, probably means reservoirs, harbors, oil stores, naval works, bridges and the big power works and radio stations and shooting of our civilians by Japanese residents in military groups and civilian garb.

We are so damned dumb and considerate of the minute Constitutional rights and even of the political feelings and influence of

people whom we have every reason to anticipate with preventive action! The Germans round them all up and keep them in pens. There isn't an American or Briton on the loose anywhere in Japan or the territory she holds. But we have to be fastidious and sylsteresque like a lot of guard-house lawyers and the first thing we know it's Pearl Harbor and we even bury inside the papers a warning by a man whose reputation for sober responsibility justified immediate alarm and radical precautions.

What Lippman says I accept as truth on the basis of his reputation, and if it is the truth we are just sitting around waiting for the enemy to stab us in the back as the German parachutists and tourists struck down Holland and Norway.

No Follow-Ups

I immediately telephoned the Scripps-Howard main office in Washington to call attention to Lippmann's warning. Our big shot said he would get right on it.

I took the privilege of calling Lippmann's alarm to the attention of the city editor of Marshall

Field's Sun in Chicago, which had printed the piece inside, along with the rest of the canned good.

Up to now I have seen no follow-up story in the news columns of any paper. There has been no word of any action in California or northward on the coast to prevent the attack which this very sure-footed, unsensational journalist predicts.

Our papers are operating under great difficulties and strain. We can't investigate half the important tips that come to us or give due prominence to information which we do confirm. Nevertheless, we have done much fine work and our worst sin has been our poisonous optimism expressed in the over-emphasis on petty victories.

But in this case I say we booted one, for if what Lippmann says is true we should have been all over the story within a few hours and the Japanese in California should be under armed guard to the last man and woman right now and to hell with habeas corpus until the danger is over.

If it isn't true we can take it out on Lippmann, but on his reputation I will bet it is all true.

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TODAY AND TOMORROW

Calif. has reason to fear all Japanese, native born, and all Japs, including Chul. d. 111

KEEP ENVELOPE ATTACHED

The enemy alien problem on the Pacific Coast, or much more accurately the Fifth Column problem, is very serious and it is very special. What makes it so serious and so special is that the Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from within and from without. The danger is not, as it would be in the inland centers or perhaps even for the present on the Atlantic Coast, from sabotage alone. The peculiar danger of the Pacific Coast is in a Japanese raid accompanied by enemy action inside American territory. This combination can be very formidable indeed. For while the striking power of Japan, from the sea and air might, not in itself be overwhelming at any one point just now, Japan could strike a blow which might do irreparable damage if it were accompanied by the kind of organized sabotage to which this part of the country is specially vulnerable.

This is a sober statement of the situation, in fact a report, based not on speculation but on what is known to have taken place and to be taking place in this area of the war. It is the fact that the Japanese Navy has been reconnoitering the Pacific Coast more or less continually and for a considerable period of time, testing and feeling out the American defenses. It is the fact that communication takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy agents on land. These are facts which we shall ignore or minimize at our peril. It also is the fact that since the outbreak of the Japanese war there has been no important sabotage on the Pacific Coast. From what we know about Hawaii and about the Fifth Column in Europe, this is not as some have liked to think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is well organized and that it is held back until it can be struck with maximum effect.

happens to Mr. Washington if he decides he would like to visit the warship, or take a walk in the airplane plant, or to drop in and photograph the general and the admiral in their quarters.

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REASON FOR PRESENCE

Now it seems to me that this is in principle and in general the procedure which ought to be used for all persons in a zone which the military authorities regard as open to enemy attack. In that zone, as in the corridors of the general's headquarters or on the deck of the warship or within the gates of the airplane plant, every one should be compelled to prove that he has a good reason for being there, and no one should be allowed to come and go until he has proved that his business is necessary and consistent with the National defense.

In the vital and vulnerable areas it should be the rule that residence, employment, communication by telephone, telegraph, automobile and railroad are confined to licensed persons who are fully identified and whose activities are fully known to the authorities and to their neighbors. The Pacific Coast is officially

a combat zone; some part of it may at any moment be a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on a battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battlefield who has no good reason for being there. There is plenty of room elsewhere for him to exercise his rights.

ALL TREATED ALIKE

This is in substance the system of policing which necessarily prevails in a war zone. By this system the constitutional and international question about aliens and citizens do not arise at the very place where they refuse the issues and prevent the taking of thorough measures of security. Under this system all persons are in principle treated alike. As a matter of National policy there is no discrimination. But at the same time the authorities on the spot in the threatened region are able to act decisively, and let the explanations and the reparations come later.

This approach to the question bypasses the problem which, as I see it, has caused the trouble in Washington. For what Washington has been trying to find is a policy for dealing with all enemy aliens everywhere and all potential Fifth Columnists everywhere. Yet a policy which may be wise in most parts of the country may be extremely foolhardy in a combat zone. Therefore, much the best thing to do is to recognize the Western combat zone as territory quite different from the rest of the country and then to set up in that zone a special regime. This has been done on the Bataan Peninsula, in Hawaii, in Alaska, in the Canal Zone. Why not also on the threatened West Coast of the United States?

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ARMY, NAVY HANDICAPPED

In preparing to repel the attack the Army and Navy have all the responsibility but they are facing it with one hand tied down in Washington. I am sure I understand fully and appreciate thoroughly the unwillingness of Washington to adopt a policy of mass evacuation and mass internment of all those who are technically enemy aliens. But I submit that Washington is not defining the problem on the Pacific Coast correctly and that therefore it is raising insoluble issues unnecessarily and failing to deal with the practical issues promptly. No one can ever hope to get the right answer unless he first asks the right questions.

The official approach to the danger is through a series of unrealities. There is the assumption that it is a problem of "enemy aliens." As a matter of fact it is certainly also a problem of native-born American citizens. There is the assumption that a citizen may not be interfered with unless he has committed an overt act, or at least unless there is strong evidence that he is about to commit an overt act. There is the assumption that if the rights of a citizen are abridged anywhere they have been abridged everywhere. The effect of assumptions has been to precipitate legalistic and ideological arguments between the military authorities out here and the civil authorities in Washington, and between the aroused citizenry of the Coast and their fellow-countrymen in the interior.

SIMPLER APPROACH NEEDED

A much simpler approach will, I believe, yield much more practical results. Forget for a moment all about enemy aliens, dual citizenship, naturalized citizens, native citizens, enemy alien parentage and conscription. Suppose a warship in San Francisco, or an airplane in Los Angeles, or a general's headquarters at Oshkosh, or an admiral's at Podunk. Then of the lineal descendant, if it happened to be such a person, George Washington, the father of the country, and consider what

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Oakland, California

Personal

F. B. Investigation
Washington

D.C.



TODAY and TOMORROW

By WALTER LIPPMANN

Mr. Green on Slavery

MR. WILLIAM GREEN, the president of the American Federation of Labor, says that he is unalterably opposed to the Austin-Wadsworth bill on the ground that it "imposes involuntary servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and in violation of our basic and most cherished concepts of freedom." If that is true Mr. Green is, of course, right in opposing the bill. If the drafting of civilians for war service re-establishes slavery, then clearly we want none of it.

But does the bill re-establish slavery? That is the question which all of us, including Mr. Green, have to face before we can conscientiously take a position on the bill.

Mr. Green will admit that drafting men for military service is not slavery. That was settled twenty-five years ago by the Supreme Court in a series of opinions deciding that a conscripted soldier is not a slave and that the selective service act of 1917 was not contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment.

The question then is whether it is slavery to draft men to do war work without putting them into uniform. For example, there is no doubt that drafted soldiers may be assigned to loading and unloading Army transports: We have troops doing just that kind of work today, and no one calls them slaves. Would it be slavery to draft men, without giving them a uniform, to do the same kind of work? Mr. Green seems to think so. He is arguing that a soldier on Army pay unloading a transport is not a slave but that some one else, not in uniform but receiving much higher pay than the soldier gets, would, if drafted for the work, be a slave.

He cannot really sustain that argument. If the government can draft a man to load a government transport a uniform cannot make the difference between freedom and slavery. In fact, there is little doubt that it is constitutional and not contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment to draft men for necessary public work. The Supreme Court in *Butler vs. Parry* upheld a statute of the kind so common in the early days of the Republic by which every able-bodied male person between the ages of twenty-one and forty-five could be compelled by the local authorities to work on the roads and bridges for six days in each year.

Mr. Green's final objection therefore, must be that it is slavery to draft a man to work in a privately owned war plant or on a privately owned farm. He cannot call it slavery to be drafted for the public service. Is it slavery to be drafted for work which, under authority of Congress, the President declares by proclamation to be "essential to the effective prosecution of the war"?

Obviously, it would be slavery to draft a man to be, let us say, Mr. Kaiser's butler or a woman to be Mrs. Luce's cook. But is it slavery to draft an able-bodied man and pay him the prevailing wage to work in one of Mr. Kaiser's shipyards? Mr. Green is entitled, if he likes, to say that it is administratively difficult. But is he en-

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titled to say it is slavery? If working in Mr. Kaiser's shipyards is not essential to the war, why do we spend money on his shipyards, why do we defer men from military service to keep them working in one of his shipyards? If Mr. Kaiser's shipyards are not vital to the war, why do we bother with them? If they are vital to the war, how, then, can we, who draft men for the Army, say it is slavery to draft men to build ships?

As a matter of fact, if Mr. Green will be open-minded enough to re-examine his position he will find that the case of Mr. Austin and Mr. Wadsworth is morally infinitely sounder than his own. Mr. Green's case is that men may be drafted to fight and that they also may be drafted to work, provided they are inducted into the Army. This means that he thinks it right to compel certain American men to serve. But the rest, because they happen to be older, or cannot pass the Army's physical tests, or have dependents, or are women and not men, may not be compelled to do what they can.

Is it really so noble, so democratic, so consonant with the principles of liberty that the few should be drafted to wage the war for the benefit of the many? I do not think so. I think that the more universal the compulsion to serve the country, the less the compulsion resembles servitude.

For what is slavery, which Mr. Green speaks about so readily? Is it the compulsion to work? Not at all. It cannot be that, because Mr. Green is not objecting to compelling men to work at Guadalcanal or in Tunisia and to their working harder and longer hours and for less pay and under worse conditions than any one works anywhere else. What, then, is slavery? Slavery is an institution under which some are compelled to work for the benefit of others who have the privilege of not working. The essence of slavery lies in the inequality of rights and duties between some men and other men. The present arrangement which Mr. Green is trying to preserve is not, of course, in fact slavery. But it is far more illiberal to draft the few than it is to draft all.

Nobody, of course, can pretend that being drafted to work at home is comparable to being drafted to fight and work abroad. Yet the more nearly all of us can share the burdens of the relatively few, the more thoroughly we shall be preserving our essential liberties.

The more we can obliterate the privilege which separates those who are compelled to serve from those who are not compelled, the nearer we shall be to the realities of democratic liberty. We know, of course, that we cannot obliterate the privileged difference entirely, because there is no way of equalizing the sacrifice in a war like ours, where the fighting is overseas. But at least we can obliterate the privilege of not having to contribute what we can contribute. We can obliterate the privilege of being able to say that because we happen to be over thirty-eight years of age, or have flat feet or are female, the country may not compel us to serve.

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Clipped at the Seat of Government.


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Handwritten: *Heinrich Himmler, Why not justice*

Today And Tomorrow

By Walter Lippmann

Our Hidden Allies



LIPPMANN

HITLER WOULD now like to stop the trial at Riom, and to also would his French agent, M. de Brinon. Well they might. For the plot which they engineered has backfired. Despite the terrorism and the treachery which envelops them, the principal figures in the trial—the judges as well as the accused—have shown that they are unconquered Frenchmen.

Hitler and his agents may have realized that M. Daladier, M. Blum, and M. Guy La Chambre were, whatever their weaknesses and failings as officials, men of honor and of personal courage. What has surprised Hitler is the degree to which the court itself has shown itself willing to maintain the honor of France. The court is not trying M. Daladier (M. Blum was not in office at the time) for having kept faith with Poland, France's ally. Whereas Hitler would like the Riom court to try M. Daladier for the "crime" of honoring the pledges of France and of resisting Nazi aggression, the Riom court is in fact trying him and the other defendants for not having defeated Hitler. Obviously it is a disconcerting disclosure that a French court, set up by the Vichy government, should have no desire to make against the men it they had soundly defeated the Nazis with whom Vichy professes to be eager to collaborate in founding a new order to last 1000 years.

THUS IT is only too evident that the French nation still consists of Frenchmen, who simply because they are French are waiting, praying, and preparing for their liberation. We must not forget that for one of the great elements of the war is the fact that behind the enemy's lines we have as our allies all the conquered and all the neutral nations of Europe. There is not one of them which, if the people could choose freely, would make a bad thing worse. Our victory. When we enter Europe, the civilian population will in the overwhelming majority welcome us as liberators.

This is one of our very greatest resources, as we can readily see from Malaya and from Burma where the position was in reverse and we had no support and the Japanese have had much support from the people of the invaded territory. It should remind us how vitally important it is to protect our hidden allies, how inconceivably stupid it will be if we do not take full advantage of the fact that to them America is more than ever the land of promise.

NO ONE knows this better than the President, and indeed no one has a greater hold upon our hidden allies than he has. It is, therefore, useful, I believe, to point out that the President's subordinates are failing him lamentably in grasping the opportunity and in making his leadership effective.

There are many branches and agencies of the Government concerned with this great matter—primarily the Department of Justice, the State Department, the Donovan organization, and in lesser though important degree the Treasury, lend-lease, the War Department through the selective service machinery, the Office of Civilian Defense, and the Red Cross. There is however no such thing as a policy—though in the President's mind there is certainly the intention to have a policy. There is no policy because no one who understands the matter has sufficient authority, and those who have some authority have not sufficiently understood the problem.

CONSIDER what happened when the question arose of making the Pacific Coast secure against the Fifth Column. Mr. Bidle, with the best intentions in the world, based his first position on two legalistic and unworkable

principles; one was that in policing the combat zone, the distinction between the alien and the citizen must be preserved; the second was that no one should be disturbed unless evidence, almost good enough to convict him in a court, had been unearthed by the official investigation. Mr. Bidle, who remembers much more vividly what he disliked in the other war than he realizes what has to be done in this war, was producing a situation on the Pacific Coast which by the end of January had become deplorable. He was failing to make this threatened area secure, and what is no less important, he was failing to make the military authorities and the people feel secure. Thus there was a double danger—the danger of the Fifth Column itself, and the danger of a popular vigilante movement to deal with it.

His policy had to be scrapped, and replaced by a kind of martial law which is now being administered without preparations made in advance to deal effectively and humanely with the evacuated people. A problem which might profitably have been studied and dealt with by the Office of Civilian Defense is being dealt with by improvisation. What is more because it has so many far-reaching implications, the security measures are based on the wrong principle: instead of evacuating the areas on the principle of military security which is applicable alike to all citizens and all aliens, Mr. Bidle had no principle when his earlier principles failed him. We are evacuating Japanese, regardless of their citizenship, whereas if the matter had been properly conceived—as a measure of military security—this unfortunate stigma need not in principle have been brought into the matter. The legal action, which in a matter of this sort is profoundly important, could have been preserved, that we were evacuating individuals and not a racial group.

THE FUMBLING of this aspect of the problem arose from the fact that nowhere in the Government is there anyone in authority who has been able to transcend legalism and bureaucracy in the formulation of a general policy in respect to aliens. This week, for example, the Selective Service announced a classification of aliens. Who prepared that classification? Those coming from "France and possessions" are classified as "neutral" in spite of the fact that French Equatorial Africa and New Caledonia in the Pacific are fighting on our side. In spite of the fact that Free French warships have been repaired in United States navy yards, and Free French merchant ships carry our war supplies.

Austria, the first of Hitler's victims, is not classified as alien. Though our Government has never recognized Hitler's seizure of Austria, all Austrians are for the purpose of the draft classified automatically as Hitler's men, that is as "enemy aliens." On the other hand, Nazis from the Sudetenland and from Danzig are classified as "co-belligerents" because they come from Czechoslovakia and Polish territory.

IS IT not evident that no one is seriously putting his mind on the question of how to distinguish our friends from our enemies, and that the effect of these fumbles and these paradoxes, of this wooden legalism and dull routine is to give aid and comfort to our enemies, to bring sorrow and disillusionment to our friends?

Certainly the President cannot take charge of the whole thing himself. But it is not high time that he placed the problem of the aliens here and of their relatives—our hidden allies abroad—in the hands of a man of the first quality, that he installed this statesman in a prominent place in the State Department, and that he directed him to make the actions of the Government conform to the realities of the war and to our peculiar American opportunity in the conduct of the war?

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